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THE PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
N June 19, 1934, a statute was approved by the President
of the United States which reads as follows:
"Rules in actions at law; Supreme Court author-
ized to make
1. "The Supreme Court of the United States shall
have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the
district courts of the United States and for the courts
of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and proce-
dure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantial rights of
any litigant. They shall take effect six months after
their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in con-
flict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
2. "Union of equity and action at la'w rules;
power of Supreme Court
"The court may at any time unite the general
rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in
actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action
and procedure for both: Provided, however, That in
such union of rules the right of trial by jury as at
common law and declared by the seventh amendment
to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate. Such united rules shall not take effect until
they shall have been reported to-Congress by the Attor-
ney General at the beginning of a regular session
thereof and until after the close of such session." I
A cursory reading discloses that while rules in actions
at law "take effect six months after their promulgation"
united rules of law and equity "shall not take effect until
128 U. S. C. § 723b and § 723c.
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they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney
General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and
until after the close of such session".
Although much has been written concerning this legis-
lation, it does not seem amiss to give a short resum6 of
its history. It was more than two decades ago, in 1912 to be
specific, that this bill was introduced in Congress, although
at first it only applied to common-law actions. Perhaps it
was for this reason that it failed of passage, since adoption
of federal rules in common-law cases would have burdened
the legal profession with the necessity of using two different
systems of procedure in the state and federal courts in addi-
tion to the separate federal equity procedure without even
the hesitant assistance in common-law cases of the Conform-
ity Act.2
In 1922, at the suggestion of William Howard Taft, then
president'of the American Bar Association which under the
vigorous leadership of the late Thomas W. Shelton of Vir-
ginia had actively supported this measure since 1910, the bill
was amended so as to include an additional section which
would permit the Supreme Court of the United States to
write rules uniting the common-law and equity principles of
procedure so as to secure one form of civil action.3
The bill, however, was not adopted possibly since it still
retained Section 1, limiting the court to the formulating of
uniform rules of common-law procedure, and it was not until
this administration that the bill was revived and passed.4
The question still remained whether the Supreme Court
228 U. S. C. § 724: This statute provides that "the practice, pleadings, and
forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty
causes, in the district courts, shall conform, as ,ear as may be, to the practice,
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like
causes in courts of record of the State within which said district courts are
held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding." Addresses at the Open
Forum Session for Discussion of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for
the Federal Courts (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 780 et seq.
I SEN. REP. No. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) ; 47 A. B. A. REP. 82
(1922); 49 A. B. A. REP. 485, 496 (1924); Taft, Three Needed Steps of
Progress (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 34; Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in
Administration of Justice in Federal Courts (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 60.
"Note 2 supra, 22 A. B. A. J. 780 et seq. (1936). A detailed historical
survey of the legislation is to be found in Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-
Making Power to thw Supreme Court of the United States (1934) 32 MicH. L.
REv. 1116; Clark and Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Back-
ground (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 38.
1937]
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of the United States would proceed only to formulate rules
at common law or would assume the full power given it and
"unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity
with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil
action and procedure for both." This question was answered
on May 9, 1935, when the Chief Justice of the United States
in an address before the American Law Institute announced
that the Court had decided that there was no need for sepa-
rate systems at law and in equity and that the Court would
proceed to formulate one set of rules.5 Shortly thereafter
the Supreme Court of the United States passed an order to
this effect and appointed an advisory drafting committee con-
sisting of fourteen lawyers and law professors from various
parts of the country, with Hon. William D. Mitchell as
chairman, to assist the Court in its undertaking and "sub-
ject to the instructions of the Court, to prepare and submit
to the Court a draft of a unified system of rules". 6
In May, 1936, this Committee, with the authority of the
Court, distributed to the bench and bar of the country the
third draft of the Proposed Rules.7 Since the American Bar
Association had had such an active part in the promulgation
of this legislation it was but fitting that this draft was first
sent to its members and that an open forum discussion of
these rules was had at the annual meeting of the Association
in Boston, Massachusetts, in. August, 1936.8 Since that
time changes have been made in this draft and the latest
revise will shortly be sent to each member of the Advisory
Committee and it will be further revised by a special sub-
committee on form and style. It is expected that the final
revision will be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United
States in the spring of this year and that the Court will then
determine whether and to what extent distribution of the
latest revise will be made. Undoubtedly further revisions will
be made and it is to be assumed that no hasty action will be
r21 A. B. A. J. 340 (1935) ; 12 Am. L. I. PROCEEDINGS 54.
'Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law
Rules, 295 U. S. 774 (June 3, 1935).
'Foreword to Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure, May, 1936;
Address of Chief Justice Hughes to American Law Institute, May 7, 1936,
22 A. B. A. J. 374 (1936).
1 Open Forum Discussion of Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A. B.
A. J. 68 et seq. (1936).
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taken, since intensive study and particularly thorough criti-
cism are essential. 9
In view of the revision which is now in process any
detailed comment on the rules set forth in the Preliminary
Draft of May, 1936, seems rather vain and will not be
attempted. However, a discussion of the Proposed Rules
from the point of view of a lew York practitioner may be of
some practical value.
Before considering some of the ninety-four rules found
in the Preliminary Draft attention is called to what seems, in
some respects, to be the most essential rule contained in this
draft. It is the last rule and provides a standing committee
on Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule reads as follows:
"Rule A. Standing Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure. There shall be a standing advisory com-
mittee on rules of civil procedure of the Supreme
Court of the United States which shall be known as
the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure.
The members of this Committee shall be appointed in
such manner and with such qualifications as the Su-
preme Court shall determine and shall hold office at
the pleasure of the Court. The Committee shall meet
once each year and may meet at any time upon call of
its chairman or the Chief Justice. All suggestions of
modification or amendment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure shall be referred to such Committee
for its report and recommendation to the Court and
the Court may refer to it other matters concerning
which its recommendations may be desired. The Com-
mittee shall, of its own initiative, make recommenda-
tions to the Court for amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall make and file an
annual report to the Court at or before the beginning
of each October Term."
Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform (1910) 4 IL.. L. REV. 491,
508. In Germany and Italy preparation, drafting and revision of the codes of
civil procedure have been in progress for over fifteen years. Vide I GAUPP,
STEN AND JONAS, Dm ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG (12th ed. 1925) pp. xxix-xxxi
and STEIN, GRUNDRISS DES ZMnaPR0ZESSRCHETES (1929) 49 in respect to the
present code; Vols. II and III, ANNUARIO DI DiRTrro COmPARATO (1929) pp.
122-232.
1937 ]
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In effect, there will thus be an ever-present body to watch
the federal procedural law in action, to recommend changes
where mistakes have been made, and to recommend improve-
ments whenever deemed necessary. As stated by Mr. Justice
Cardozo, "The duty must be cast on some man or group of
men to watch the law in action, observe -the. manner of its
functioning, and report the changes needed when function is
deranged." 10 The Advisory Committee's Note on this very
vital rule refers to additional treatises advocating the crea-
tion of a standing committee or ministry to supervise not
only procedure but also all statutory matter.
The general spirit and characteristic of the rules are to
obliterate the procedural distinction in the federal courts
between law and equity. The first two Proposed Rules indi-
cate the objective sought:
"Rule 1. Scope of Rules. These rules shall gov-
ern the procedure in the district courts of the United
States and in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia [District Court of the United States for the
District of Columbia] in all civil cases wherein it is
sought to obtain the relief previously obtainable by
actions at law and suits in equity. They are to be con-
strued in all particulars so as to further and secure as
speedily, simply, and inexpensively as possible the just
determination of every action.
"Rule 2. One Form of Action and One Mode of
Procedure. Hereafter there shall be only one form of
10 CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS p. 41 et seq.; see
also Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J. 787; Sunderland, Character and Extent of the Rule-Making Power
Granted United States Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise
(1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 404; "While power to amend the rules is not explicitly
given by the Act of 1934, yet it would seem that power initially to establish
rules carries with it, by necessary implication, the power to make changes as
occasion or necessity may require. * * * Perhaps more question arises as to
whether amendments of the 'united rules', or new rules supplementing them, must
be reported to Congress. While caution might suggest that they be so re-
ported, it seems possible to argue that under the statute only the 'uniting' of
the rules need be reported, and that since such union be a single act accom-
plished at one time, later changes need not be so reported. This last construc-
tion would avoid delay; and delay in making some amendments or additions
might be embarrassing." Clark, Power of the Supreme Court to make Rules of
Appellate Procedure (1936) 49 HARV. L. REv. 1303; Shientag, A Ministry of
Justice in Action (1937) 22 CoR-N. L. Q. 183.
[ VOL., 11
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action and one mode of procedure. The form of action
shall be known as 'civil action' and the procedure
shall be known as 'civil procedure'."
To attorneys practicing in code states, these two rules
have a familiar sound. No one can deny that a decidedly
forward-looking step has been taken in federal procedural
reform. Overridden are the rather sporadic and unsuccessful
attempts towards unification to be found in the Equity Rules
permitting the transfer to the law docket of law actions erro-
neously begun as suits in equity,: permitting a court of
equity to dispose of matters ordinarily determined at law in
an equity suit,1 2 in the statute permitting amendments to
pleadings when the case is brought to the wrong side of the
court I3 and in the statute permitting the interposition of
equitable defenses and equitable relief in actions at law.'
4
Henceforth there will be only one civil action and one civil
procedure. However, the Proposed Rules expressly provide
that nothing therein contained shall be construed as extend-
ing the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States
as it is now or may hereafter be established. Each rule shall
be taken as limited to actions and issues which are within
such jurisdiction.1
Colonel Wigmore in his address to the American Bar
Association, at its annual meeting in Boston in August of
last year, pointed out three preliminary defects which should
be corrected in any subsequent draft.' 6 These are: (1) the
draft fails in its numbering to make provision for additions
and amendments. The expansive method which is now com-
mon in many states should be employed; (2) many of the
sections are too long and separable propositions are not
placed in separate sections; and (3) the failure to incorpo-
1 1Equity Rule 22.
Equity Rule 23.
28 U. S. C. §397.
1428 U. S. C. § 398; Liberty Oil Company v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260
U. S. 235, 43 Sup. Ct. 118 (1922).
is Proposed Rule 91; cf. Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limi-
tations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 393; Frankfurter, Distribu-
tlion of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts (1928) 13
CORN. L. Q. 499.
"Wignore, A Critique of the Federal Court Rules Draft (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J. 811.
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rate and assemble all the relevant procedural statutes in the
rules. As the rules now stand frequent references of this
sort are found "any existing statute shall here govern to the
extent to which it is applicable". Every federal practitioner
knows the difficulty in ascertaining whether he has found all
the relevant statutes on the subject that he has under cohi-
sideration. They are so scattered. Any set of rules should
obviate this unnecessary labor. These objections are merely
mentioned in passing, since it is assumed that they have
already been covered in the latest draft which is now in
preparation.
COMMENCBMENT OF ACTION, SERVICE OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS,
MonioNs AND ORDERS (ARTicLE II)
The first rule -under this title (3) deals with the com-
mencement of action and is the first of a number which have
been prepared by the Committee in the alternative. One alter-
native provides that the action may be commenced by the ser-
vice of the summons and complaint without the previous filing
in court of the complaint. The other alternative requires the
filing of the complaint in court as an essential requisite to
jurisdiction. The second alternative is similar to Equity Rules
11 and 12 while the first sets forth the practice familiar to New
York State practitioners although it does not seem to permit
the commencement of an action without a complaint.17 Provi-
sion is also made that the action will abate as to any defen-
dant upon whom the summons and complaint have not been
served within sixty days after the commencement of the
action without a court order extending the time for service.
Special reference is made to this rule in the foreword of the
Preliminary Draft commencing at page ix. This rule must
be considered in conjunction with Rule 6(b), which deals
with the service and filing of pleadings and other papers and
provides for three alternatives: (1) filing of all papers; (2)
no filing except after notice from the adverse party requiring
such filing and in any event before the action is called for
trial; and (3) filing within a specified time. It seems that
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 16, 100, 218 et seq.
[ VOL. 11
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the second alternative which is similar to the New York rule
is the more desirable. 8 It avoids early publicity, lessens fees
and lightens the burden of the district court clerk since
a great number of cases are settled without trial or hearing
under such circumstances that the papers need never have
been filed. The formality, publicity and certainty which is
claimed to exist when immediate filing is essential do not
impress a New York State practitioner. It also seems unnec-
essary to provide that a summons and complaint abate after
the action has been commenced unless served within sixty
days thereafter. Why limit the life of the summons or at
least why burden the court by requiring the signing of many
additional orders? The provision that a complaint must
accompany the summons is a proper one. A person who
feels that he has a claim against another should at least have
prepared a complaint before effecting service on his oppo-
nent. Some of the older practitioners in New York seemed
to feel, and rightly so, that the plaintiff who does not go to
the extent of serving his complaint with the summons indi-
cates thereby that he has no great faith in his cause of action.
Of course prompt filing in common-law cases has been the
rule in the federal courts in the state of New York even under
the Conformity Act,' 9 but there seems to be no real necessity
for such a requirement. In connection with service of papers
other than process it might be advantageous to provide for
service through the attorney's office letter drop or box in
addition to leaving the paper at his dwelling.20
The form of the summons and method of service is pro-
vided for by Rule 4. A uniform method of service is provided
for, including actions against the United States, and there no
longer is the requirement that the summons must be issued
by the clerk of the Court, which in fact was always a mere
formality. No change, of course, has been made as to the
territorial jurisdiction of the district courts. However, it is
provided that service is effected if made anywhere within the
' Cf. Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 533; Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New
Rules (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 787.
a9U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y. Commor LAw RULES 1, 2 and 4; U. S. D. C.
E. D. N. Y. CoanxoN LAW RULEs 1 and 2.
'Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. RULE 20.
1937 ]
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state, even in those states which contain two or more dis-
tricts, and service upon the United States is made uniform.21
The method of service on a natural person is similar to that
provided for by the present Federal Equity Rules. 22 There is
no specific rule providing for service by publication.
Proposed Rule 7 seems to be a salutary one. First of all
it provides that the period of time required for the doing of
any act or the taking of any proceeding shall not be affected
or limited by the expiration of a term of court, except (1)
motions for a new trial,23 (2) relief against accident, fraud,
material evidence newly discovered etc. 24 and (3) the time
for taking an appeal. Somewhat similar to the Equity
Rules, 25 the rule provides that where the time prescribed by
these rules or by rules of the court for doing any act, includ-
ing the time for taking an appeal26 expires on a Sunday or
legal holiday, such time shall include the next succeeding
day that is not a Sunday or legal holiday. It is assumed that
this provision includes local state holidays.
PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS (ARTIcLE III)
The pleadings contemplated are (a) a complaint, (b)
an answer, (c) a reply, where provided by the rules, and
"further pleadings as the court may order." Demurrers,
pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency of a pleading are not
to be used.2 7 The rules also provide for a "cross-claim" which
is a claim by one defendant against another, arising out of
the transaction which is the subject matter of the action
including a claim that such co-defendant is or may be liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of the claim made by the
plaintiff against such cross-claimant.28  Provision is also
- Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 45, 763, 766 and 902.
Equity Rule 13.
Proposed Rule 65 (b).
Proposed Rule 66(b).
2Equity Rule 80.
2 Cf. U. S. C. §§ 230 and 350; Siegelschiffer v. Penn. Mut. Life. Ins. Co.,
248 Fed. 226 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
' Proposed Rules 9 and 20.
'Proposed Rule 18; cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 264 and 271.
[ VOL. 11
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made for a "third-party-complaint" and for a "third-party-
answer".
20
Considering the complaint, we find that "the complaint
shall be sufficient if it contain (1) a short and plain state-
ment of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand
for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 30 Provision
is also made for separately stating and numbering "when-
ever such separation facilitates the clear presentation or ade-
quate understanding of the matters set forth".31 The ten-
dency indicated is, therefore, against such separate state-
ments. Is that wise? Surely, separate statements should
always be required where a party is pleading legal and equi-
table causes of action in the same complaint. Changes in
procedure do not alter the substantive differences between
the common law and equity. The rules also accentuate "sub-
stantial justice" and permit alternative and hypothetical
pleading, regardless of consistency. 32
Care has apparently been taken not to use the old
phrases of code pleading such as "cause of action", "facts"
or "material facts". It is interesting to compare these rules
with Section 241 of the New York Civil Practice Act, which
states:
"Every pleading shall contain a plain and con-
cise statement of the material facts, without unneces-
sary repetition, on which the party pleading relies,
but not the evidence."
and with the comparatively new Illinois Civil Practice Act
(Section 33) which provides that:
"All pleadings shall contain a plain and concise
statement of the pleader's cause of action, counter-
claim, defense, or reply."
'Proposed Rules 9 and 19.
'Proposed Rule 14.
'Proposed Rule 11.
Proposed Rule 12. See Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical Pleading
(1923) 33 YALE L. J. 365.
1937 ]
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It seems that the Committee had in mind the explana-
tion given by the late Professor Edward W. Hinton for leav-
ing out of the new Illinois Civil Practice Act the words
"facts" or "material facts".
"The Committee * * decided to omit the word
'facts' in order to minimize so far as possible the con-
troversy that has arisen in so many code states where
pleadings have been constantly attacked as setting out
conclusions rather than facts ** *,
"All the earlier writers on Code Pleading empha-
sized that the new system was a: fact system and that
the pleader was to state facts, the whole facts, and
nothing but the facts, and that has led to a great deal
of useless controversy. No pleading was ever formu-
lated that stated facts and nothing- but facts. It is
impracticable if not impossible to make a pure fact
statement. The common-law system with which you
are familiar made practically no attempt to require
the statement of facts. Just consider for a moment.
The common count in assumpsit alleged that the de-
fendant was indebted to the plaintiff for goods, wares
and merchandise sold [and] delivered to him, and,
being so indebted, in consideration thereof underwrote
and promised to pay-not a single fact. Absolutely
not a single fact. What, in point of law, creates a
debt? It is not stated. What, in point of law, consti-
tutes a delivery? It is not stated. What, in point of
law, constitutes a promise? It is not stated. The
pleader simply states the legal result of unstated facts.
Those are the common counts in assumpsit." 83
The Committee, however, wisely included a further Sec-
tion so that no contention can be made that the" old common
counts have been abolished by stating:
"Common Counts. A pleader may employ one or
more of the appropriate so-called 'common counts' sub-
3HINTOm, ILLINOIS CiviL PRACTICE ACT (1934) p. 6; cf. Clark, "Facts"
and "Statement of Fact" (1937) 4 U. OF CHI. L. Rlv. 233; Clark, The Proposed
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 22 A. B. A. 3. 447.
[ VOL. 11
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ject to the power of the court to order a fuller state-
ment under the provisions of Rule 17." 3
It is doubtful whether the provision that a complaint
shall contain a "short and plain statement of the claim show-
ing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief" is an improvement
on the requirement that a complaint "shall contain a plain
and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action". The
objective sought seems to be the same. The phraseology does
not seem to help.
Rule 17 deals with bills of particulars, and motions to
make more definite and certain and to strike. It would seem
that only bills of particulars are contemplated with respect
to properly pleaded common counts, otherwise the privilege
to use the common counts would be an empty one.
Joinder of causes of action called "claims", as previously
noted, is provided for under the title of Parties.35 A party
is permitted to join in one pleading, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many different claims, legal or equitable or
both, as he may have against an opposing party. This rule is
in harmony with the recent development both in code and
common-law states toward unlimited joinder of actions and
contains the usual condition that the court may in further-
ance of justice or convenience or to avoid prejudice order a
separate trial of any distinct issue or issues.3
Provision is also made for a set of forms 37 which it is
assumed will include sufficient pleading forms to guide the
practitioner so as to avoid the many pitfalls which he
has encountered whenever ancient landmarks were swept
away.38 These forms are not contained in this draft.
I Proposed Rule 13(6).
'Proposed Rule 25.IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT new § 258 (1935); ILL. REV. STAT. § 172 (1935);
N. J. COMP. STAT. §§ 163-287 (1911-1924) as modified by N. J. Sup. CT. RuLE
21 (1926) ; see also Equity Rule 26; Dickler v. Nat. City Bank of N. Y., 160
Misc. 317, 289 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1935); Epp v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co.,
160 Misc. 554 (1935); Medina, Shall New York Surrender Leadership in Pro-
cedural Reform? (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 158.
'Proposed Rule 8.
'Two well-known examples in New York of such difficulties are: Hahl v.
Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901) and City of Syracuse v. Hogan, 234
N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923), (1923) 23 COL. L. Rwv. 590. See also Hum
v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933), (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 699; Rothschild, New
York Civil Practice Simplified (1923) 23 COL. L. REv.. 618, 620, (1924) 24 CoL.
1937 ]
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The answer, reply or "other responsive pleading" need
only set out in short and plain terms the denial or matter in
avoidance of each claim asserted in the :pleading to which it
is responsive.3 9 These provisions are supplemented by a rule
which deals with "Defenses" used in a broad sense and such
defenses are not limited to the defendant.40 Furthermore, ob-
jections concerning the sufficiency of the service of process,
venue, and "lack of the courts' jurisdiction" are found under
that heading but must be raised, as is the usual practice, by
motion before answer. The condition, however, is imposed
that such objections must be raised at one time. The usual
technical requirement, particularly where the sufficiency of
the service of process is raised, that the defendant specifically
state that he is appearing "specially" is abolished, the rule
providing that such a motion shall constitute a special ap-
pearance without being denominated as such. It is also pro-
vided that these objections cannot be raised by a defendant
at any other time or in other manner. It does not seem clear
why the contention of the court's own lack of jurisdiction
must be raised before answer. It is axiomatic that the par-
ties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that does not have
it 4 1 and in fact the rule continues by providing that the
court of its own motion may at any time raise the objection
of its own lack of jurisdiction. Perhaps the revisors intended
a distinction between "lack of the court's jurisdiction" and
the court's "own lack of jurisdiction". In other words, the
recognized difference between jurisdiction of the person and
jurisdiction of the subject matter may have been intended.
Some clarification would be helpful. These provisions are
also made applicable to a third-party-defendant. Every de-
fense in point of law or fact other than motions on the
pleadings, 42 summary judgment motions, 3 and motions to
L. REv. 732, 733, (1926) 26 CoL L. REv. 30, 33, (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 258,
262; Clark, The Union of Law and Equity (1925) 25 CoL. L. REV. 1; McCas-
kill, One Form of Cizil Action, But What Procedure for the Federal Courts(1935) 30 ILL. L. REv. 415; Cook, "Facts" and "Statement of Fact" (1937) 4
U. oF CHI. L. REv. 232; Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes
(1921) 21 COL. L. Rlv. 416; Schulman and Jaegerman, loc. cit. supra note 15;
Wheaton, The Code "Canse of Action": Its Definition. (1936) 22 CoRN. L. Q. 1.
81 Proposed Rule 15.
40 Proposed Rule 16.
2Cf. 28 U. S. C. §80.
2 Proposed Rule 16(d).
- Proposed Rules 42 and 43.
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strike, to make more definite or for a bill of particulars, 4"
when addressed to the complaint must be made in the answer
and when addressed to a claim or defense in the answer must
be made in the reply.45 Provision is also made for the sepa-
rate trial of a defense wherein the decision may finally dis-
pose of the whole or a material part of the issues. This may
include the entry of final judgment, with the privilege of
amendment, however, upon good cause shown.
The rule also permits motions for judgment on the
pleadings by either party within ten days after the pleadings
are closed. This subdivision is not as broad as the judgment
on the pleadings provisions in the New York Civil Practice
Act which permit the motion to be made at any time if war-
ranted by the pleadings or the admissions of the party.46 But
in this connection reference should be made to Proposed Rule
43, which will be considered later.
The Proposed Rules, it seems, fail to provide for a mo-
tion to dismiss before answer, similar to that found in the
Equity Rules 47 or in the New York Civil Practice Act and
Rules. 48 This seems proper since there is no reason why an
action should be delayed until the determination of such a
motion. Affimative defenses must be pleaded as such. Mis-
takenly designating a counterclaim as a defense or ice versa
does not prevent the court from giving it its proper title.
The Proposed Rules make it mandatory upon a defen-
dant to state in his answer any claim which he has at the
time against a plaintiff, which arises out of the transaction
that is the subject of the action provided that the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim and can, if the presence of
third parties is essential for its adjudication, acquire juris-
diction of such parties.49 The present Equity Rules contain
a similar provision which seems to have worked well and,
because of its mandatory feature, has generally resulted in
great liberality in the court's allowing the setting up of
" Proposed Rule 17.
Proposed Rule 16(c).
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 476, N. Y. Civ. PRac. RULE 112.
'
7 Equity Rule 29.
's N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 277; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. RULES 106 and 107.
"'Proposed Rule 18.
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counterclaims. 50 But the clause "provided the court has juris-
diction to entertain the claim and can, if the presence of third
parties is essential for its adjudication, acquire jurisdiction
of such parties" is new.
The .Proposed Rule, however, will compel a party to
interpose a legal counterclaim if it arises out of the subject
matter of the action and provided it meets the other require-
ments above stated. This, of course, is not the rule under
the Equity Rules which have been interpreted as mandatory
only when the cross-demand is equitable.51 The new Rule
because of its mandatory provision should not deprive the
defendant of his right to trial by jury with respect to his
legal counterclaim. That seems to be taken care of in the
Proposed Rules dealing with jury demands. 52 Clarification
might be helpful. The interposition of other counterclaims
against a plaintiff is optionable with the defendant but the
counterclaim must be a claim which might be the subject of
an independent action and a claim that the court. has juris-
diction to entertain.
Under the mandatory counterclaim clause of Equity
Rule 30, the federal courts have permitted the inclusion of
counterclaims for unfair competition by threats in bad faith
to bring patent suits against the defendant's customers in
suits in equity against the defendant for infringement of a
patent.53 Do the words above quoted, i.e., "provided the court
has jurisdiction to entertain the claim", indicate an inten-
tion on the part of the drafters of the Proposed Rules that
this class of counterclaim, too, is going to be subjected to the
test of qualifying as a proper independent subject for federal
jurisdiction?
This Rule also permits an answer to state a cross-claim
against another defendant arising out of the transaction
which is the subject of the action, including a claim that such
co-defendant is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all
or part of the claim made by the plaintiff against such cross-
Equity Rule 30; HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (7th ed.) pp. 208-449.
American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U. S. 360, 43 Sup. Ct.
149 (1922).
Proposed Rules 45-47.
Kamagraph Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230 (S. D.
N. Y. 1935) ; Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933), (1933) 33 COL. L. Rv.
699, (1933). 46 HARV. L. Rv. 1339, (1936) 36 COL. L. Rav. 1002.
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claimant; such an answer must be served upon the defendant
against whom it is asserted who must reply to the cross-claim.
Since provisions for a reply are set forth, it obviates the
problem that arises under a somewhat similar section of
the New York Civil Practice Act where no provision is made
for a reply to the cross-claim. 54
Additional persons may be brought in by court order as
parties defendant when the determination of a counterclaim
or cross-claim requires their presence as parties and juris-
diction of such persons can be had and their presence will not
oust the court of jurisdiction of the action. The court may,
in its discretion, order severance of any counterclaim or
cross-claim which does not go to diminish or defeat the recov-
ery sought by the plaintiff,55 or may direct a separate trial
thereof. Separate judgments are also permissible and in case
separate judgments are rendered, the court may order a delay
in the execution of a prior judgment until a subsequent judg-
ment or subsequent judgments are rendered.
Third party impleader 56 is permitted. This procedure
has been successful in admiralty for many years 57 and under
the Conformity Act has been applied in actions at law in the
federal courts."" The Proposed Rule provides that with the
service of the answer or within a reasonable time thereafter,
a defendant may apply ex parte for leave as a third-pf.rty-
plaintiff, to serve a summons and complaint upon a person
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to such
defendant (thereafter to be called the third-party-defendant)
for all or part of the claim made against him by the plaintiff.
The rule sets forth in detail the method of service of the
summons and pleadings and permits impleader by a party
r' N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 264 and cases cited thereunder.
What is the meaning of "does not go to diminish or defeat"? "A coun-
terclaim 'must tend in some way to diminish or defeat the plaintiff's recovery,'
and even though the counterclaim be otherwise sufficient, if under its allegations
the defendant could recover only nominal damages, it does not tend to diminish
or defeat the plaintiff's recovery." Lehman, J., in Stafford v. Mincor Trading
Corporation, (Special Term Part IV, N. Y. County) N. Y. L. J., Jan. 25,
1922, p. 1456.
Proposed Rule 19.
0 U. S. Sup. CT. ADmIRALTY RULE 56 (1920); cf. Munson Inland Lines,
Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 36 F. (2d) 269 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 193(2) ; Lowry & Co., Inc. v. Nat. City Bank of
N. Y., 287 F. (2d) 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1928).
1937 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
brought in by original impleader, a right which is also
granted under the New York State practice. The third-party-
defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third-party-
plaintiff's liability to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to
the third-party-plaintiff. If a third-party-defendant is
brought in, the plaintiff may amend his pleadings so as to
assert against him any claim which he (the plaintiff) might
have asserted against such third-party-defendant had he been
joined originally as a defendant. This runs contrary to the
New York rule where the theory is zealously adhered to that
the plaintiff has no claim against the party brought in; there,
it remains a controversy between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant and a separate and distinct controversy between the
defendant and the third-party-defendant. 0 The plaintiff is
also given the right to implead if a counterclaim is asserted
against him. Whether an impleader will be granted in negli-
gence actions where there are joint tort feasors is a matter of
speculation. The Proposed Rule is certainly broad enough to
permit it.60
One amendment of his pleading is allowed a party as a
matter of course unless the action has already been placed
on the trial calendar. Other amendments are by leave of
court and "shall be freely given when the ends of justice so
require." Pleadings shall be deemed amended to conform to
all evidence that is received without objection and even if
objection is made and the court is satisfied that the admission
of such evidence would actually prejudice the objecting party,
the court must (1) sustain the objection or (2) allow the
pleadings to be amended and order a continuance on terms.
The burden, however, is upon the objecting party.61 It is
proper "that a party is not to be penalized by any error in any
formal statement or allegation he has made",62 but does not
9Travlos v. Commercial Union of Amer., 135 Misc. 895, 238 N. Y. Supp.
692 (1930).
'Fox v. Western N. Y. Motor Lines, 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289 (1931);
Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in New York (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 269;
Bennett, Bringing in Third Parties by the Defendant (1935) 19 MINN. L. REv.
163; Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendant's Rights against Third
Parties (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1147; Gregory, Loss Distribution by Compara-
tive Negligence (1936) 21 MINN. L. Rlv. 1.
'Proposed Rule 22.
Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J..447.
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such liberality in amendments encourage slipshod pleading?
Should not the burden be on the guilty party to show to the
satisfaction of the court that such amendments are not preju-
dicial to the objecting party?
The same Proposed Rule contains a subdivision to the
effect that amendments of the pleadings shall relate back to
the date of the original pleading so amended "whenever the
claim or defenses asserted in the amended pleading arose out
of the conduct, transaction or occurrence specified, set up,
or attempted or intended to be specified or set up in the
original pleading." It seems that the liberality of this pro-
vision would at times act extremely unfairly on a defendant
in a case where the plaintiff amends and the plea of the
Statute of Limitations, for instance, is involved. A defendant
should be permitted to plead the statute in the case where the
period has run between the date of the commencement of the
action and the date of the order granting the amendment.6 3
Provision is, of course, made for supplemental pleadings.
Following to some extent the English Rules under the
Judicature Act, 4 the Proposed Rules provide that the court
on motion of any party or sua sponte may order issues pre-
sented by the pleadings to be disregarded upon determining
that there is no real and substantial dispute as to these issues
and may formulate the issues as to which there is any real
and substantial dispute between the parties. The court, how-.
ever, may in its discretion refuse to entertain such a motion.
This rule thus makes provision for a limited pre-trial
hearing.65
Motions may also be made within a specified time for a
more definite statement or a bill of particulars.66 This rule
requires the furnishing of a bill of particulars of the allega-
tions of complaint before service of an answer and probably
also of a bill of particulars of the denials of an answer or
similar pleading since the rule provides that "a party may
Harriss v. Tams, 258 N. Y. 229, 179 N. E. 476 (1932) ; but see note of
the Committee to this Rule which states that "'Relation back' is a well recog-
nized doctrine of recent and now more frequent application."
0, ENGLISH RULES UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACT, 0. 33, r. 1; 0. 34, r. 9;
0. 30, r. 1 (1935).
Proposed Rule 23. Cf. A Proposal for Minimizing Calendar Delay in
Jury Cases (The New York Law Society, December, 1936).
' Proposed Rule 17.
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move for * * * a bill of particulars of any matter set forth
therein which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly * * * to meet it at the
trial." If this interpretation is correct the rule goes far
beyond anything known in New York State procedure 67 and
seems to encourage "fishing expeditions". This should not
be permitted. Failure to comply with an order to make more
definite or for a bill of particulars subjects the offending
party to the possible penalty of having the pleading to which
the motion was addressed stricken out.
A bill of particulars is to be treated as a part of the
pleading which it supplements. This is the rule in New
York.68
Provision is also made in the same rule permitting the
court at any time on motion or sua sponte to order any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous matter
stricken from any pleading upon terms. This is treated in
most code states as a preliminary objection which must be
raised by motion within a specified time after receipt of the
offending pleading.6 9 This rule, however, is similar to Equity
Rule 21 dealing with scandal and impertinence which does
not prescribe the time within which such objection must be
raised.
Following substantially the provisions of the Federal
Equity Rules,70 every pleading must be personally signed by
an attorney of record but it is not required to be sworn to or
verified except as stated below. 71 Such signature is considered
a certificate by him that (1) he has read the pleading, (2) to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground for supporting it, and (3) it is not interposed for
delay. Wilful violation or failure to sign justifies the strik-
ing out of the offending pleading and for wilful violation of
the rule an attorney may be held in contempt of court or
subjected to other appropriate disciplinary action and simi-
-Bracken v. Toland, 153 App. Div. 57, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1043 (lst Dept.
1912) ; Barreto v. Rothschild, 93 App. Div. 211, 87 N. Y. Supp. 553 (1st Dept.
1904).
" Harmon v. Alfred Peats Co., 243 N. Y. 473, 154 N. Y. Supp. 314 (1926).
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. RULES 103, 104 and 105.
Equity Rules 21 and 24.
Proposed Rule 10.
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lar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter or
false allegations are inserted. If a party is not represented
by attorney he must himself sign the pleading on the same
conditions. This rule expressly continues any specific rule
or statute which requires a pleading to be verified or accom-
panied by an affidavit.72
The requirements of Federal Equity Rule 27 with re-
spect to a stockholders' bill are incorporated with a few
verbal changes in Proposed Rule 21.
PARTIES INCLUDING JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTIONS
(AitmCL IV)
The first provision found under this title is that
defining the real party in interest and except for chang-
ing "person" to party (a questionable change of style),
it is Section 210 of the New York Civil Practice Act and
verbatim it is Equity Rule 37. It is questionable whether the
concept of the real party in interest should be continued in
this form in view of the confusion that this term has caused
under code pleading and in view of the question raised in
suits brought by assignees of patent claims.73 The same rule
contains some helpful provisions with respect to capacity to
sue and pleadings on behalf of natural persons under disa-
bility.
Persons who have a joint interest either as plaintiffs or
defendants must be joined as parties except that when they
are so numerous as to make it impracticable to include them
all as parties, such number of them as will fairly insure the
- Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 377a, 377b, 377c, 381 and 762; cf. It is hoped that the
old equity rule that a sworn answer was admissible in evidence and required the
testimony of two witnesses or one witness plus corroborating circumstances to
overthrow it, is no longer the rule, 7 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRAcricE (1931)
§ 4588; but see Demarest v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 257 Fed. 162
(D. Conn. 1919) and Farrell v. Forest Investment Co., 73 Fla. 191, 74 So. 216(1917).
1 Eagleton, Two Fudamentals for Federal Pleading Reform (1936) 3 U.
OF CHi. L. REv. 376; Eagleton, Proposed Parties and Joinder Sections for
Federal Pleading Rules (1936) 3 U. OF Cr. L. Rav. 597; Clark and Moore, A
New Federal Civil Procedure 11 Pleading and Parties (1935) 44 YALE L. J.
1291; cf. Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269
U. S. 459, 46 Sup. Ct. 166 (1926), (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 1018, (1926) 20 ILL.
L. REv. 726, (1926) 4 TEx. L. Rav. 385.
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adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, join
as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants.74 The Proposed
Rules also provide for liberal joinder of parties plaintiff and
defendant jointly, severally or in the alternative provided
any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or
defendants, as the case may be, will arise in the action.75 A
plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or
defending against all the relief prayed for and judgment may
be given according to the respective liability of the parties.
The remainder of the rule on class suits provides that when
the persons who might join or be joined are so numerous as
to make it impracticable to include them all as parties, such
a number of them as will fairly insure the adequate repre-
sentation of all may, on behalf of all,. join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants. Substantially similar provisions are
found in the more modern code states and represent only
a moderate expansion of the present equity practice to cover
both law and equity actions.7 6
There is a further requirement that the names of parties
who should have been joined and the reason for their omis-
sion be stated.7 7
The practice of interpleader is carefully covered by the
rules so that provision is made not only for strict inter-
pleader and for actions in the nature of interpleader but also
along the lines of joinder in the alternative.78 This Proposed
Rule is much more liberal than the interpleader rules of New
York State.7' The so-called Federal Interpleader Act of
1936 80 is not repealed nor are certain interpleader statutes
which are applicable only to special cases.81
The subject of intervention is also provided for and the
Proposed Rule 26.
Proposed Rule 27.
I Cf. Notes of Advisory Committee to Proposed Rules 26 and 27.
'Last paragraph of Proposed Rule 26; consider Gilman v. Rivis, 10 Pet.
298 (U. S. 1836) which upheld a demurrer to a declaration against Rivis upon
a joint objection of Rivis and one Lyne where no reason was assigned in it, why
Lyne was not a party to the action.
" Proposed Rule 28.
"N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§285, 286 and 287; N. Y. BANKIG LAW
§§ 113, 199 and 250; N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 206.
28 U. S. C. § 41 (26) ; cf. Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 963.Cf. Note of Advisory Committee to Proposed Rule 28.
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application to intervene must be granted (1) in any action,
so long as the court has control of it, in which the applicant
is or may be bound through his representation by existing
parties to the action and it appears that such representation
is or may be inadequate; and (2) in an action where property
is in custodia legis, if the applicant "is so situated that dis-
tribution or other disposition of the property would adversely
affect him." Intervention may also be granted to anyone who
could originally have been made a party plaintiff or defen-
dant under Proposed Rules 26, 27 and 28.82 Again we find
that this Rule is not all-inclusive and that various federal
statutes have to be consulted to determine the rights and
procedure of intervention in certain cases.8 3 Why not incor-
porate them in the Rule? 84
DEPOsITIoNs, DiscovERY AND SUmmARY JUDGMENTS
(AnTicum V)
The rules under this title are rather advanced steps
in federal as well as in state procedure. Eo parte
Fiske,85 is buried and the other extreme is reached so
that an examination may be had at any time and used
for almost any purpose. An examination before trial
even before issue joined may be had orally or through
written interrogatories not only of the party, but of his
agents or employees, of the officials and employees of any
public or private corporation, partnership or association,
which is an adverse party, and of any witness who is unwill-
ing or hostile. They all may be examined as if under cross-
examination." Of course, adequate provision is made to per-
petuate testimony under the provisions of Section 866,
United States Revised Statutes, 28 U. S. C. § 644, or in
accordance with the practice of any state wherein the depo-
sition is taken (not wherein the action is pending).87 The
Proposed Rule 29.
' Note of Advisory Committee to Proposed Rule 29.
s' Cf. supra pp. 217-218.
113 U. S. 713, 5 Sup. Ct. 724 (1885).
s Proposed Rule 31(a).
Proposed Rule 31(b).
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provision as to the scope of the examination is also extremely
liberal. The witness may be examined regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the pending action,
whether relating to the claim or defense of the examining
party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, subject-matter, custody, location
and opportunity for inspection of any books, documents, or
other tangible things.18 Limited safeguards have been incor-
porated in the rules, such as the appointment of a master
before whom the testimony may be taken who is authorized
to rule on the admission of evidence, and the stopping of an
examination of a party at any time by the court when the
examination is not conducted in good faith.8 9
These limitations, it would seem, are not sufficient to
protect the parties. No examination should be granted un-
less the good faith of the examining party is evident since
the abuse of deposition machinery to harass adversaries is
real and not fanciful, particularly in certain types of action.
Furthermore, the examination should not be allowed until
after issue joined and even then the examination should be
limited to matters relevant to the issues in the cause. It is
only after that time that the nature of the issues is defined
and ordinarily no hardship is imposed if the right to
examine is postponed until then. There is no objection
to a special rule providing for an examination before
issue joined if the court is satisfied that unusual cir-
cumstances exist.90  As stated by Judge Finch of the
New York Court of Appeals: "The more examinations
and applications to the Court a plaintiff may make, the
greater is the nuisance value of the litigation and the expense
thrust upon a defendant no matter how meritorious his de-
fense." 91 Since the examination is also open to the defen-
dant as soon as the action has been commenced it is contended
that the rule "will actually lessen the chance of perjured
Proposed Rule 31(c).
'Proposed Rule 32(b) and (c).
'Cf. Recommendations of the New York Law Society on Examinations
before Trial (1935).
Finch, Some Funamental and Practical Objections to the Preliminary
Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the U. S. (1936)
22 A. B. A. J. 809.
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testimony" 92 and that "in actual practice, if defendants avail
themselves of the device it is more likely to discourage fishing
expeditions than otherwise, an opinion which I find shared
by defendant's lawyers in Missouri where the rule has been
found effective." 93 But it is pertinent to ask whether the
defendant in a complicated stockholder's action, for instance,
is in a position to proceed at once on receipt of the complaint
to conduct an efficient or productive examination before trial
of the plaintiff before the plaintiff has commenced his exami-
nation of the defendant. Provision is, of course, made to
compel the attendance of witnesses.94
Proposed Rule 37 allows a party at any time after the
commencement of the action to require his adversary to fur-
nish him with a list of all documents, books, photographs or
other tangible things which are relevant to any matter in-
volved in the action and are or have been in his possession or
control. No court order is required and the burden is placed
upon the party served to apply for an order modifying it. It
seems that the objections above enumerated as to the pro-
posed rules on examinations before trial also apply as far as
pertinent. There is no question that the purpose is a laudable
one but since such a rule tends towards requiring his adver-
sary to prepare his opponent's case, at least an order of the
court should be required to prevent abuse.95
Both physical and mental examinations of persons are
permitted pursuant to court order on good cause shown.98
Provision is also made for furnishing a written statement of
the findings of the examination.9 7 Physical examinations are
permitted in a number of states and under the Conformity
Act have been allowed in personal injury actions in the
federal courts embracing New York State since the enact-
Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J. 447.
w Clark, A Striking Feature of the Proposed New Rules (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J. 785; see also Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments
(1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 881.
Proposed Rule 51 (Subpoena).
SILL. RuLEs orF PRAcTIC, rule 17 (1933) ; Conboy, loc. cit. supra note 93.
'Proposed Rule 39(a).
Proposed Rule 39(b).
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ment of the Civil Practice Act permitting a physical exami-
nation without oral testimony."
Proposed Rule 40 is similar to Sections 322 and 323 of
the New York Civil Practice Act providing for requests by
one party to the other for written admissions of the genuine-
ness of documents and written admissions of specified rele-
vant facts.
Provision is also made for the effective enforcement of
answers to questions or of demands to give discovery 9
There are two rules dealing with summary judgment.
The first one might be called an enlarged motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings and admissions, plus depositions.100
This is contrary to the motion known to New York practi-
tioners, where depositions may not be used.101 The adverse
party may file opposing affidavits and the court has discre-
tion to permit either party to take and file depositions or to
present oral testimony. When that is granted the New York
Summary Judgment Rule 113 is approached except that in
New York oral testimony is not permitted. In order to
grant the motion the court must find that there is no sub-
stantial issue of fact affecting the right of the moving party
to judgment. It seems unwise to permit the taking of oral
testimony. A preliminary trial should not be permitted.
When testimony is taken there is an unconscious tendency to
weigh the evidence.
The other Proposed Rule permits any party seek-
ing- to recover upon, or any party seeking to defend
against, a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim to move for sum-
mary judgment on affidavits. The affidavits must set forth
facts which on their face would require a decision in his
favor as a matter of law.102 The motion is available in any
action and to that extent it is a departure from the existing
English and American rules. In New York the relief is made
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 306; 28 U. S. C. § 635; Bailey v. Texas Co., 34
F. (2d) 829 (E. D. N. Y. 1929).
Proposed Rule 41.
Proposed Rule 42.10N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §476; N. Y. Civ. PPAc. RULE 112; The words
"admissions of a party or parties" refers to admissions made in the action, and
intended to be treated as a part of a pleading or made to avoid some question
arising on the pleading, Lloyd v. R. S. M. Corp., 251 N. Y. 318, 167 N. E. 456
(1929).
Proposed Rule 43.
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available only in certain enumerated cases but the class is so
large that the Commission on Administration of Justice rec-
ommended some time ago that all restrictions be removed." 3
Summary judgment has proved to be a very effective remedy.
Its constitutionality has been upheld in New York,104 and
under the Conformity Act it has been employed in the Fed-
eral Courts in New York in law cases.'0 5 The Proposed Rule
goes considerably beyond the existing New York rule with
respect to the procedure on the motion since the court may,
in its discretion, permit affidavits to be supplemented or
opposed by depositions, oral testimony or other evidence or
may permit further affidavits to be filed at any time, or may
permit or require any affiant to be present in court for exami-
nation or cross-examination. The comment as to Proposed
Rule 42 applies here even more emphatically. The taking of
testimony upon such a motion may only be preliminary to an
actual trial of the issues. Thus in cases where the court
denies a motion after hearing testimony, there would in fact
be a second trial when the case is actually reached for trial.
Such procedure may have the effect of duplication or of
slowing up rather than of expediting the administration of
justice. 06
The probability of trial duplication has been foreseen in
Proposed Rule 44 which is as follows:
"If, on motion under Rules 42 or 43, judgment shall
not be rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial shall be necessary, the court,
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the plead-
ings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall, so far as may be conveniently possible,
ascertain what material facts exist without substan-
tial controversy and what material facts are actually
IN.3 Y. Civ. PRAc. RULES 113, 114; Report, Commission on Administra-
tion of Justice (1934) at p. 287; for a detailed survey of summary judgments
in New York see Shientag, Sumnmary Judgment (1935) 4 FORDHAm L. REv. 186.
" General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N. Y.
133, 139 N. E. 216 (1923).
'2,Maslin v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 368 (S. D. N. Y.
1932) and cases cited therein.
1Q Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and Summary Judgments (1936) 22 A.
B. A. J. 881.
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and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon
make an order specifying the facts that appear with-
out substantial controversy, including the extent to
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in
controversy, and directing such further proceedings in
the action as may be just. Upon the trial of the action
the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly, unless the
court, for good cause shown, sets aside its preyious
order."
This provision seems to be an attempt to create machin-
ery for a pre-trial hearing in a rather backhanded way. If a
pre-trial hearing is desirable procedure it should not be pro-
vided for in this manner.10 7
TRIALS (ARTICLE VI)
The ensuing eighteen Proposed Rules deal more particu-
larly with the trial procedure. The first Proposed Rule under
this title provides for the preservation of the copstitutional
right of trial by jury as directed in the enabling act. 08
"In suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed $20, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by the jury shall
be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common
law."
This is the mandate of the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution. Accordingly the right to a jury trial is absolute
in law cases in the federal courts unless waived in writing
or by oral stipulation in open court.109 If waived in any other
manner the rights on appeal are considerably restricted. Un-
'
07 For a discussion of the Pre-Trial Hearing, see A Proposal for Minimiz-
ing Calendar Delay in Jury Cases (The New York Law Society, December,
1936); ef. supra p. 229.
'Proposed Rule 45.
"o28 U. S. C. §§ 773, 875.
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der the Proposed Rules the right to jury trial is preserved but
the methods of waiver are greatly expanded. Thus if a jury
trial is desired of all or some of the issues it must be affirma-
tively demanded. This rule is prepared in the alternative de-
pendent upon the time of filing of pleadings.110 In either case,
however, a written demand for a jury must be served upon
the other parties to the cause within a specified time. Failure
of any party to serve such a demand constitutes a waiver by
him of all rights he may have to a jury trial. The claim or
demand may specify the issues which the party wishes to
have so tried, otherwise there will be a jury trial of all the
issues. If a jury trial is demanded of only a part of the
issues any other party may, within a specified time, claim a
jury trial of any other or all of the issues of fact in the case.
This method of jury waiver is common in many of the states
and, to a limited degree, is the rule applicable to the counties
comprising the city of New York.1 l1
Proposed Rule 46 prescribes that where a jury was duly
demanded the action shall be entered on the docket as a jury
case. It must be so tried unless the parties file a written
stipulation consenting to trial by the court alone or so stipu-
late in open court. Of course, the court upon motion or of
its own initiative may find that a right of jury trial of some
or all of the issues does not exist under the Constitution or
statutes of the United States in which event no jury trial
may be had as to such issues although timely demand was
made. In other words, the service of a demand for a jury trial
under Proposed Rule 45 cannot create a right to jury trial not
existing at common law. Furthermore, in all actions, the
court may on motion or suw sponte order any issues to be
tried by jury, although no right to trial by jury exists either
because not originally "demandable" or because of waiver. A
clarification of the meaning of "demandable" in this connec-
tion would be helpful. Provision is also made for an advisory
jury. Contrary to the present federal equity practice of try-
ing equitable issues first the proposed rule leaves to the court
to determine the sequence in which the jury and non-jury
issues shall be tried.
'"Cf. Proposed Rule 6(b) and discussion tipra pp. 218-219.
m N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr § 426.
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Proposed Rule 47 makes provision for the assignment of
cases for trial. Two alternatives are proposed: (1) that the
cause go on the trial calendar automatically after the plead-
ings are completed, and (2) that the cause go on the trial
calendar upon motion of a party and notice to the other par-
ties. In view of the suggestion made in respect of filing
pleadings (Proposed Rule 6(b))112 the second alternative
should be adopted.
The Proposed Rules also prescribe generally the in-
stances when an action may be dismissed without preju-
dice," 8 and when actions may be consolidated or severed." 4
The next Proposed Rule deals with testimony and evi-
dence." 5 As is the rule at present, oral testimony in open
court is prescribed and the competency of a witness to testify
is determined by the law of the state in which the court is
held. All evidence is admissible which would be admissible
under the rules of evidence applied in the trial of federal
equity cases and also all evidence which would be admissible
in-a state court of general jurisdiction under the statutes and
decisions of that state wherein the United States court is
held. Adverse parties or unwilling or hostile witnesses may
be examined as if under cross-examination and contradictory
statements of any witness may be shown. Errors in the ad-
mission or the exclusion of evidence shall not be a ground
for setting aside a verdict or for reversing, modifying or
otherwise disturbing a judgment on appeal in the absence of
material prejudice to substantial rights.
The Proposed Rule, however, fails to bring about a reform
of the federal rules of evidence. That reform is needed, is
unquestionable. "1* * * the law of evidence in our Federal
Courts is in a most deplorable condition. It is inferior to that
of any of the fifty States and Territories-I say, inferior to
any of them, and not only inferior but far inferior. * * * I for
one have long ago given up hope of being able to state what is
the Federal law on any rule of Evidence. I merely note the
Pp. 218-219 supra.,
Proposed Rule 48. That a motion to dismiss without prejudice, in every
real sense, is a motion for non-suit, see Holdeman v. United States, 91 U. S.
584, 23 L. ed. 433 (1876) ; It re Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U. S. 86, 44 Sup.
Ct. 446 (1924).
' Proposed Rule 49; cf. 28 U. S. C. § 734 (Consolidation of causes of like
nature).
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tenor of the new ruling and file it away where it seems to be-
long on top of the preceding mass of rulings." 116 How far the
enabling act includes the law of evidence remains in doubt
since the tendency in the past has been to regard evidence as
falling within the Rules of Decisions Act although the Com-
petency of Witnesses Act and the Conformity Act have also
been considered by the federal courts whenever evidence ques-
tions have arisen.'17 Still some attempt at conformity could
have been attempted without raising the question of whether
the rules of evidence affect the substantive rights of the liti-
gant. The Proposed Rule also prescribes that nothing in the
rules shall limit or restrict the methods of proving documents
and other public records provided by existing statutes of the
United States. No attempt has been made to re-assemble
them although it is a known fact that they are scattered
throughout the code.
The suggestion made by Colonel Wigmore seems an ex-
cellent one, that is, to re-assemble in one Evidence chapter
the chief rules now scattered elsewhere. "3y 'chief rules' I
mean not all of them, for there are scores and scores in all,
but only the rules that are likely to be applicable in the
general rule of cases. Thus the practitioner will be able to
find collected in one place those principal rules. This does
not mean to reform these rules. It does not even mean to
repeal their statutory status. It means merely to repeat and
re-assemble them in the place where they belong and where
they are needed." 118 Dean Wigmore has prepared in connec-
tion with his laudable criticism of this rule a memorandum
and draft of rules consolidating and simplifying the federal
statutes on proof of official records and filling some of the
gaps in this field of evidence. 19 It is to be hoped that the
"' Proposed Rule 50.
11 Wigmore, A Critique of the Federal Court Rules (1936) 22 A. B. A. J.
811.
", 28 U. S. C. § 725. This statute has always been considered as dealing with
substantive rights; cf. McNeil v. Holbrook, 37 U. S. 84 (1838) ; Ex parte Fisk,
113 U. S. 713, 5 Sup. Ct. 724 (1885) ; Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American
Co., 189 U. S. 221, 23 Sup. Ct. 517 (1903); 28 U. S. C. § 631; 28 U. S. C.
§ 724; Leach, State Law of Evidence in the Federal Courts (1930) 43 Hnv. L.
Pv. 554; Callahan and Furguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 622.
'See note 116, supra.
I Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 50.
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Federal Rules when adopted will contain a few carefully
drafted flexible rules in respect of evidence.
An important step in the right direction is the abolition
of formal exceptions. 120 This rule prescribes that it will be
sufficient for all purposes for which an exception was hereto-
fore necessary that an objecting party shall, at the time the
ruling or order of the court was made or sought, make known
to the court the action which he desires the court to take or
his objection to the action of the court. If a ruling or order
is made without a party having an opportunity to object, the
necessity of objection is also obviated. It should, however, be
noted that the provision in the New York Civil Practice Act
that exceptions need not be taken to rulings of law made dur-
ing the trial lasted only about two years.121 The federal stat-
utes dealing with bills of exceptions 122 and the review of find-
ings in cases tried without a jury 23 are superseded in so far
as they provide for formal exceptions and a bill of exceptions.
Precise objections to the court's charge to the jury, however,
and perhaps exceptions to the charge are not abolished. 12 4
The examination of prospective jurors is limited in the
court's discretion to such questions as the court itself may
propound and the court may refuse to permit the parties or
their attorneys to examine the jurors directly. This is now
the general practice in the federal courts. It is also provided
that in any action to be tried by a jury the court may direct
that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel be
called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. 25 The alter-
nate juror shall replace a "juror who for any reason may
become unable to perform his duties in the case." One addi-
' Proposed Rule 52.
= Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 445 and 446; the latter Section, under the
1936 amendment, restores the pre-1934 requirement that exceptions must be
taken to rulings of law made during the trial. By the addition of a new subdi-
vision 2 to C. P. A. § 583, it is provided, however, that the appellate court, in
the interests of justice, may review a prejudicial ruling made during the trial
though no exception was taken, provided there was an objection or there was a
refusal or failure by the court to grant such a motion or request. The purpose
of the amendment was to aid the trial justice by permitting him to know whether
or not his rulings are acquiesced in; cf. Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 18.
=28 U. S. C. § 776.
= 28 U. S. C. § 875.
Proposed Rule 57; U. S. Sup. CT. GEN. RuILEs rule 8.
Proposed Rule 53.
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tional peremptory challenge is accorded in choosing an alter-
nate juror or jurors. This Proposed Rule is similar to that
now existing in federal criminal cases 120 and in New York
in civil and felony cases. 1 27 The Proposed Rule, however, is
broader in that it permits alternate jurors in any case since
the court does not have to find that the trial is likely to be
a protracted one. The contingency for the replacing of a
juror is not limited to the situation where "a juror die, or
become ill, so as to be unable to perform his duty."
The parties may also stipulate in any action to be tried
by jury that the jury may consist of less than twelve and
that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors
shall be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.1 28 The
rule does not prescribe the form of the stipulation but it is
assumed that the stipulation must either be in writing and
filed or be oral and made in open court. The Proposed Rule
merely recognizes what already has been a common practice
in civil causes. The Proposed Rules further provide that in
jury cases the court, with the consent of the parties, or sua
sponte in cases not triable of right by the jury, may require
the jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a
special written finding, upon each issue of fact. 29 This is
similar to the procedure in New York.130 Provision is also
made in any action tried before a jury for the court in its
discretion to submit to the jury written interrogatories upon
one or more matters of facts involved in the action and to
direct the jury both to make written answers to such inter-
rogatories and to render a general verdict. This procedure has
long been recognized in federal practice.131 The Proposed
Rule prescribes further that when the answers are consistent
with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the gen-
eral verdict, the court may enter judgment in accordance
with such answers notwithstanding the general verdict, or
'328 U. S. C. §417a (1932).
'MN. Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 449-a (1935); N. Y. CODE oF CRIMr. PROC.
§ 358-a (1933).
" Proposed Rule 54.
'Proposed Rule 55 (a).
IN. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT §§ 459 and 461.
'Proposed Rule 55(b); 3 FOSTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE (6th ed.) p. 2431
et seq.; Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interroga-
tories (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 575.
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may return the jury for further consideration of its answers
and verdict, or may order a new trial. Answers inconsistent
with each other and one or more likewise inconsistent with
the general verdict, prevent the court from entering judg-
ment but permit it to return the jury for furthei' considera-
tion of its answers and verdict and to order a new trial.
The next subject treated by the Proposed Rules is that
of motions for a directed verdict.132 It is first provided that
such a motion must state the specific grounds therefor and
that in any jury case, a party mayso move at the close of the
evidence offered by an opponent without thereby waiving his
right to offer evidence in the event of the denial of the mo-
tion. Furthermore, a motion for a directed verdict which is
not granted is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all
parties to the action have moved for directed verdicts. These
are desirable provisions since they do away with the present
unnecessary technicalities familiar to all trial lawyers. 133
The second portion of this rule deals with the right of a
trial judge in a jury case to take verdicts subject to the ulti-
mate ruling on the questions reserved-the reservation carry-
ing with it authority to make such ultimate disposition of
the case as might be essential to the ruling under the reser-
vation, such as entering a verdict or judgment for a party
where the jury has given a verdict for the other, or ordering
a new trial. The Proposed Rule also contains a suggested
proviso to the effect that where there is a right to a trial by
jury under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, the
court shall not, without the express consent of the jury,
reserve the question of the sufficiency of evidence to
support a verdict in favor of any party who shall object
to such reservation. The Committee expresses the hope
in its Foreword to the Proposed Rules that the inclu-
sion of this proviso will not be found necessary by the
Court in the light of Slooum v. New York Life Ins. (o., and
Baltimore and Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman.13 4 At common
Proposed Rule 56.
Swift & Co. v. Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 17 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A.
4th, 1927).
'Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure (May 1930), Foreword
pp. xii-xiii; Note to Proposed Rule 56; 228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523 (1912)
and 295 U. S. 654, 55 Sup. Ct. 890 (1935).
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law, as stated by the Supreme Court in the Slocunz case,
there were two well-recognized instances in which the ver-
dict of a jury could be disregarded and the case disposed of
without a new trial. One was where the defendant's plea con-
fessed plaintiff's cause of action and set up matter in avoid-
ance which, even if true, was insufficient in law to constitute
a bar or defense; and the other was where the plaintiff's
pleadings, even if its allegations were true, disclosed no right
of recovery. If in either instance a verdict was taken, the
court nevertheless could make such disposition of the case as
was required by the state of the pleadings, and this because
the issues settled by the verdict of the jury were wholly
immaterial. In the first instance the court's action was in-
voked by a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, and
in the latter by a motion to arrest judgment on the verdict.
"A motion for judgment non obstante veredicto is one
which is only made by a plaintiff * * * . It is given
when, upon examination of the whole pleadings, it
appears to the court that the defendant has admitted
himself to be in the wrong, and has taken issue on
some point, which, though decided in his favor by the
jury, still does not at all better his case. A motion
'in arrest of judgment' is the exact reverse of that for
judgment non obstante veredicto. The applicant in
the one case insists that the plaintiff is entitled to the
judgment of the court, although a verdict has been
found against him. In the other case, that he is not
entitled to the judgment of the court, although a ver-
dict has been delivered in his favor. Like the motion
for judgment non obstante veredicto, that in arrest of
judgment must always be ground upon something ap-
parently on the face of the pleadings." '35
Thus in the Sloeuom case where the pleadings presented
an issue of fact and the jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision held
that neither the trial court nor the appellate court could
thereafter direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground
'M SMITH, AcnoN AT LAw (12th ed.) 147.
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that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's ver-
dict, but must order a new trial. The theory expounded by
the Court was that when the court rejects the jury's findings
of fact, it reopens the issues of fact and if it enters a judg-
ment contrary to that of the jury by itself determining those
issues it contravenes the provisions of the Seventh Amend-
ment to the Constitution that no fact in a common-law action
where the controversy exceeds twenty dollars, tried by a
jury "shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." 130 This decision, of course, did not bind the state
courts and many state courts refused to reach the same con-
clusion. In the federal courts means were found to escape
the effect of this decision by falling back on the common-law
method of reservation by the court of decision of a question
of law until after the jury had rendered its verdict.137 Then
in 1935 the Supreme Court decided the case of Baltimore and
Carolina Line, Inc. v. Reedman, supra, where an action had
been brought in the federal court in New York to recover
damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the
plaintiff through the defendant's negligence. The issues were
tried before the court and a jury. At the conclusion of the
evidence the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a ver-
dict for the plaintiff, and for a directed verdict in its favor for
the same reason. The Court reserved decision on both motions,
submitted the case to the jury subject to its opinion on the
questions reserved, and received from the jury a verdict for
the plaintiff. No objection was made to the reservation or
this mode of procedure. Thereafter the Court held the evi-
dence sufficient and the motions ill-grounded and accordingly
entered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict. On appeal
to the Circuit Court of Appeals the court held the evidence
I See critical comment: Thayer, Judicial Administration (1915) 60 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 585; Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure(1918) 31 HARv. L. REv. 669; see favorable comment: Schofield, New Trials
and the Seventh Amendment (1913-1914) 8 ILL. L. Rlv. 287, 381, 465; see
generally Clark and Moore, A New Federal Procedure: L The Background
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 387.
Hoffman v. American Mills Co., 288 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923);
Italian Star Line v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d)
359 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); Note (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 166.
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insufficient and reversed the judgment with a direction for a
new trial. The defendant contended that the direction be for
a dismissal of the complaint. The Court of Appeals held
that under the decision of the Slocum case the direction had
to be for a new trial. The Supreme Court, having granted cer-
tiorari, held that in reversing because as a matter of law the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, the judgment
of the Circuit Court of Appeals should embody a direction
for a judgment of dismissal on the merits, and not for a new
trial, and that such judgment of dismissal would be the
equivalent of a judgment for the defendant on a verdict
directed in its favor. The Supreme Court distinguished the
Slocum case on the ground that there the defendant's request
for a directed verdict was denied without any reservation of
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence or of any other
matter and the verdict for the plaintiff was taken uncondi-
tionally, and not subject to the court's opinion on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, while in the present case the trial
court expressly reserved its ruling on defendant's motion,
the verdict for the plaintiff was taken pending the court's
rulings on the motions and subject to those rulings, and no
objection was made to the reservation or this mode of pro-
ceeding. The Court accordingly stated that the parties must
be regarded as having tacitly acceded to them. The basis of
this later decision was that at common law there was an
established practice of reserving law questions arising dur-
ing trials by jury and of taking verdicts subject to the
ultimate ruling on the questions reserved; "and under this
practice," the Court held, "the reservation carried with it
authority to make such ultimate disposition of the case as
might be made essential by the ruling under the reservation,
such as non-suiting the plaintiff where he had obtained a ver-
dict, entering a verdict or judgment for one party where the
jury had given a verdict to the other, or making other essen-
tial adjustments." Since this rule was well established when
the Seventh Amendment was adopted, the Court states it
must be regarded as a part of the common-law rules to which
resort must be had in testing the right of trial by jury as
protected by the Amendment. Such was the holding of the
Court.
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Thus it appears that the common-law theory that where
a reservation had been taken, the jury in fact consented that
the court's ultimate ruling on questions of law would be a
part of the verdict, was relied upon in the Baltimore and
Carolina Line case. Accordingly, in such a case, if the court
ruled that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
support the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff, and
that judgment should be entered in favor of the defendant, the
verdict was not overruled or the jury's province trespassed
upon, since the jury had consented to such procedure. In early
days the consent of the jury was actually obtained, but later
on the consent was merely presumed.138 If the Court had solely
rested its opinion on this ground, it is submitted there would
be little doubt of the propriety of such procedure. The Court,
however, also emphasized the fact that the plaintiff's counsel
had made no objection to the reservation of the court. Does
that mean that if the plaintiff had made a timely objection
that the holding would have been different? The weight of
authority seems to be that the consent of the parties is not
needed to reserve a question of law, but the doubt remains.
Still, it is submitted that the real basis of the decision is the
holding of the Court that at common law there was a well-
established practice of reserving questions of law arising
during trials by jury and of taking verdicts subject to the
ultimate ruling on the questions reserved and "whatever may
have been its origin or theoretical basis, it undoubtedly was
well established when the Seventh Amendment was adopted
and therefore must be regarded as a part of the common-law
rules to which resort must be had in testing the meaning of
the right of trial by jury as preserved and protected by that
Amendment." 139 A finding that no objection was made to
the reservation was not necessary in order to support the
Court's conclusion. Indeed the aim of the Seventh Amend-
ment is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure
but to preserve substantive rights. The question of reserva-
SNote (1935) 45 YALE L. J .166; cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 457-a
providing that the jury may direct a verdict when he would set aside a contrary
verdict as against the weight of evidence.
Baltimore and Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654, at 660, 55 Sup.
Ct. 890 (1935) ; Cohen, The Supreme Court on J idgnzents non obstante vere-
dicto (1935) 22 VA. L. REv. 188.
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tion seems merely a matter of form and procedure. Further-
more, it is submitted that the matter contained in the proviso
above set forth, need not be included in the Proposed Rule
since, as previously stated, the consent of the jury to the res-
ervation was at common law merely presumed except during
the early years of its application. However, the provision that
wherever a motion for directed verdict is made at the close of
the case, "the court shall be deemed to have reserved thereon
and to have taken the verdict subject to a later determination
of the question involved," seems improperly phrased. Why not
provide that in such a case the trial court must state on the
minutes that the judgment will be entered non obstante vere-
dicto? Thus we have a situation similar to that existing
under the common law as stated in the Baltimore and Caro-
lina Line case and also an express indication by the court
of its intention.
The next rule deals with the matter of instructions to
jury and objections. This rule provides that in any jury case
a party at or before the close of the evidence may request the
court in writing to instruct the jury on the law as set forth
in such request. The court must, so far as practicable, inform
counsel of its proposed action upon such requests prior to
their arguments before the jury. The court, however, is re-
quired to instruct the jury after the arguments are completed.
It is also prescribed that the giving or the failure to give an
instruction cannot be assigned as error unless the objecting
party objected thereto before retirement of the jury, such
assignment stating distinctly the objectionable matter and
the grounds of the objection. So that the jury may not hear
arguments as to the law of the case the rule provides that
opportunity must be given to make such objections out of
the hearing of the jury.140 There does not seem to be any-
thing unusual in this rule. The fear expressed by some writ-
ers that the jury may be influenced by argument of counsel
has not presented any difficulty in the State of New York. The
jury has been either excused or, as is more usual, has
been advised by the court that such discussion must not influ-
ence their verdict.' 4 1
" Proposed Rule 57.
4 Cf. Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 533.
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Provision is also made for a reference to a master
but such reference shall only be made in exceptional
cases. 142 In actions which are to be tried by a jury, a refer-
ence may only be made when the issues are complicated. In
New York it is provided that in jury cases a compulsory
reference may only be had in a limited class of cases.143 The
rule further prescribes that in actions without a jury, save
in matters of account, a reference shall be made only in case
it appears that the court cannot otherwise give to its other
business the attention and dispatch required. In other words,
in non-jury cases a reference is also the exception. This, it is
submitted, is the proper rule.144
Proposed Rules 60 to 62 inclusive deal with the powers
of a master, his report, objections thereto, the judgment to
be entered on his report and also his appointment and com-
pensation. In cases tried by a jury the findings of the master
on the issues are prima fade evidence of the matters therein
contained. In all other cases his findings and conclusions
are presumptively correct. The rules express to some extent
the principle laid down in Ex Parte Peterson, where the Su-
preme Court held that a court rule providing for the appoint-
ment of an auditor whose findings were to be treated as prinm
facie correct was not in violation of the Seventh Amend-
ment.1 45 Provision is also made that the entire action or an
issue may be referred by consent to a master as an arbitrator
and in such case the master's report may only be reviewed in
accordance with the principles governing a review of an
award and decision by an arbitrator.
. Proposed Rule 58.
11 Cf. N. Y. Civ. PAc. Acr § 466 which reads in part: "Compulsory ref-
erence. The court, of its own motion, or upon the application of either party,
without the consent of the other, may direct a trial of the issues of fact, by a
referee, where the trial will require the examination of a long account on
either side and will not require the decision of difficult questions of law. * * *";
cf. Schaffer v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 269 N. Y. 336, 199 N. E. 503(1936) as to possible constitutional problems.
'" See balance of N. Y. Civ. PRac. Act §466 providing: "In an action
triable by the court without a jury, a reference may be made as prescribed in
this section to decide the whole issue or any of the issues or to report the
referee's finding upon one or more specific questions of fact involved in the
issue." Cf. Comments on appointment of special masters in Lane, Twenty
Years under the Federal Equity Rules (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 638.
'5253 U. S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 543 (1920); ef. Equity Rules 49 (Evidence
Taken before Examination, etc.) and 53 (Notice of Taking Testimony before
Examiner, etc.); U. S. D. C. S. D. N. Y. GENERAL RULE 26.
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JUDGMENT AND APPEAL (ARTICLE VII)
The trial is now ended and provision is accordingly made
for the judgment and the appeal.
Proposed Rules 63 and 64 make provision for judgments
both after trial and by default and for costs. In the spirit of
joinder of law and equity the Proposed Rules provide only
for the "judgment"; the decree has disappeared. The form
of the judgment or order, however, has been modelled after
the Equity Rules since Proposed Rule 63 prescribes that "a
judgment or order shall not contain a recital of any plead-
ing, the report of any master, or the record of any prior
proceeding." 146 Similar to the New York statute, a judg-
ment or final order may be entered by the court upon any
issues determined in favor of or against any party at any
stage of action and the action may proceed as to the remain-
ing issues or parties as justice may require.' 47 But to what
extent may a split-judgment be entered?
The New York Court of Appeals had the following case
before it recently.148  The plaintiff had brought a suit in
equity for a declaratory judgment that a divorce obtained by
her husband in another state without personal jurisdiction
was void, that she was his lawful wife and that the marriage
entered into by the defendants (plaintiff's husband and the
woman whom he married after the foreign divorce) was
invalid. As "further or consequential relief" plaintiff asked
an injunction restraining the defendants from holding them-
selves out as husband and wife, and restraining the female
defendant from using the name of Mrs. Lowe. A motion was
made by the defendants to dismiss the complaint. On the
argument of the motion it was conceded by the defendants
that the foreign decree of divorce was void and that the plain-
tiff was entitled to a declaratory judgment as prayed for in
the complaint. After that admission the motion proceeded,
without objection, as an attack upon plaintiff's cause of
action for injunctive relief. The court of first instance denied
the motion on the ground that "whether plaintiff is entitled
""o Equity Rule 71.
Proposed Rule 63(b).
Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934).
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to the further and consequential relief which she demands
cannot be determined on a motion of this nature." By a
divided court the Appellate Division affirmed the order but
granted permission to appeal on certified questions, the one
applicable to this discussion being:
"Under section 476 of the Civil Practice Act and
rule 112 of the Rules of Civil Practice, after the defen-
dants have admitted to the extent shown by the record
plaintiff's right to have a declaratory judgment ren-
dered in her favor, should defendants' motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings dismissing the complaint have
been granted on the ground that the complaint fails
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
for the injunctive relief sought therein?"
The Court of Appeals held that the provisions of the section
"that judgment may be rendered by the court as to a part of
a cause of action and the action proceed as to the remaining
issues, as justice may require," did not mean that where all
allegations of a pleading are directed towards the establish-
ment of a single cause, and the relief asked is appropriate to
such cause of action, a motion may be granted for a judgment
which merely adjudicates selected issues, and leaves adjudi-
cation of whether a cause of action is established and appro-
priate relief should be granted, until the determination of
the remaining issues. "The Civil Practice Act should not be
so construed as to authorize a judgment upon a 'part of a
cause of action' where the part is an incomplete fragment of
an entire claim which cannot be thus divided without mutila-
tion." The court, however, in reversing and granting the
motion, said:
" * * * It [-Section 476] expressly authorizes a
judgment upon a 'part of a cause of action.' The only
test that can be applied without thwarting the legis-
lative intent is a practical test. Is it possible to
divide the claims or cause of action so that an effective
judgment can be rendered as to part, without mutila-
tion of the whole?
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"Judged by that test, it is clear that a judgment
dismissing that part of the complaint which makes
claim for injunctive relief may be granted where
the complaint contains no allegations which would
entitle the plaintiff to such relief, especially where the
right to a declaratory judgment is established by the
pleadings or by admissions made for the purpose of
permitting the entry of appropriate judgment. A
judgment which dismisses that 'part of a cause of
action' which claims injunctive relief constitutes a
complete adjudication of a separate part of the com-
plaint. The cause of action for a declaratory judg-
ment remains complete and no cause of action for
other relief has been effectively pleaded."
The holding is a proper one and, it is submitted, the
principle there laid down should be applied to the Proposed
Rule even though "cause of action" and "a part of a cause of
action" are not found in it but only the words "any issue or
issues". To permit judgments on issues which are incom-
plete fragments of an entire claim which cannot be divided
without mutilation would surely not tend towards simplicity
but rather towards confusion.
It is provided that a judgment or order entered pursuant
to the rule shall be treated as final for all purposes including
an appeal. Costs are allowed, as in equity, in the discretion
of the court except that where express provision therefor is
made either by federal statute or by the Proposed Rules the
two latter, as the case may be, control.149
In order to make it clear that a judgment shall give both
legal and equitable relief if a party is entitled to such upon
the merits, special provision is made therefor and the right
to enter a deficiency judgment in foreclosure cases is also
taken care of.'" 0
Default judgments for want of a proper pleading may
be entered by the court clerk upon proof of due jurisdiction
where the plaintiff's claim against the defendant is for a sum
"'Proposed Rule 63(d). Cf. Payne, Costs in Common Law Action's in the
Federal Courts (1934) 21 VA. L. REv. 397; Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300,
40 Sup. Ct. 543 (1920) ; 28 U. S. C. §§ 815, 829, 830 and 836.
' Proposed Rule 63(c); cf. Equity Rule 10.
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certain or for a sum which to be made certain requires noth-
ing more than computation, eliminating, of course, the cases
where the defendant is an infant or an incompetent.15' In
other cases of default application for judgment must be made
to the court.152 This rule is made applicable also to a third-
party-plaintiff, or a defendant who has pleaded a cross-claim
or a counterclaim.
Motions for new trials are also provided for under this
title.1 53 The rules permit the granting of a new trial on all
or part of the issues (1) in actions where there has been a
jury trial for any of the reasons for which new trials are
granted in actions at law and (2) in other actions for any
of the reasons for which rehearings are granted in equity
suits. Why was the distinction between law and equity pre-
served in this instance? It does not seem necessary. The
moving papers must set forth the grounds for the motion.
The rule further provides that in an action tried without a
jury the court may open the judgment, if entered, to take
additional testimony, to amend or to make new findings of
fact and conclusions of law and to enter a new judgment. It
would thus appear that even in jury cases triable as of right
by jury if the jury is waived the rules at present applicable
to equity would apply. The court at any time within ten
days after the entry of an order for judgment or the reception
of a verdict may order a new trial for any reason for which
it might grant a new trial upon motion of a party.
Provision is also made that where an issue to be retried
is so distinct and separable from the other issues in the action
that a trial of that issue alone may be hind without injustice,
the court may order a partial new trial specifying clearly
those issues to be retried. This provision is permissive, not
mandatory, and should be of assistance particularly in cases
where the court questions merely the amount of the damages
suffered by the complaining party. However, this practice
may not properly be resorted to unless it clearly appears
that the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from
Proposed Rule 64(1) ; cf. N. Y. Civ. PiAc. AcT §§ 485-487.
Proposed Rule 64(2) ; cf. N. Y. Civ. Pimc. Act §§ 488-490.
"= Proposed Rule 65.
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the others that a trial of it alone may be had without
injustice.1' 4
The next Proposed Rule provides for the relief at any
time from clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and from errors arising from oversight
or omission. 15 5 It is also provided that on prompt motion
and before the appeal time has expired the court on terms
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judg-
ment, order or other proceedings upon any of the following
grounds: (1) accidental mistake, surprise or inadvertence;
(2) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an ad-
verse party; (3) material evidence newly discovered which
the moving party could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial. If such grounds for
relief against a judgment are known to exist during the
period within which he could move for a new trial, then he
must resort to a motion for a new trial. 56 It is specifically
stated that nothing in the rule shall limit the power of the
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party
or his legal representative from a judgment, order or other
proceeding.
The Federal Declaratory Judgment is continued. 57 As
recently stated by the United States Supreme Court, 5 8 "The
act of June 14, 1934, providing for declaratory judgments,
does not attempt to change the essential requisites for the
exercise of judicial power. By its terms it applies to 'cases
of actual controversy,' a phrase which must be taken to con-
note a controversy of a justiciable nature, thus excluding an
advisory decree upon a hypothetical state of facts." The rule
adds a further provision to the effect that the existence of
"Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Co., 283 U. S. 494 (1930); see also
Dimick v. Schredt, 293 U. S. 474, 55 Sup. Ct. 296 (1935) (5 to 4 decision) re
power of court conditionally to decrease or increase a verdict, where power to
decrease is recognized and power to increase is denied; Matter of MacKenzie,
Jr., 272 N. Y. 403, - N. E. (2d) - (1936).
"'Proposed Rule 66(a) ; cf. Equity Rule 72 which limits period for cor-
rection to the time at which final decree is rendered, and N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ACT§§ 105-112.
Proposed Rule 66(b).
Proposed Rule 67.
I' Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 56 Sup. Ct.
466 (1936) (citing Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288
U. S. 249 [1932]).
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another adequate remedy shall not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.",
The next Proposed Rule prescribes that in all actions
tried without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.160 This is
an extension of Equity Rule 7012 in so far as it includes jury-
waived cases in addition to suits in equity and supersedes
the present statutory provisions as to the trial of issues of
fact by the court and the review in cases tried without a jury
in so far as they provide a different method of finding facts.
It might be well to provide that the court must only "state
the facts which it deems essential" in order to avoid volumi-
nous findings.16' Provision is also made for findings and con-
clusions where the court refuses or grants interlocutory
judgments. 16 2 Similar to the present Equity Rule such find-
ings and conclusions must be included in the record on
appeal. These provisions are common in many jurisdictions
and cannot be objected to despite the fact that an additional
burden is thereby placed upon judges in jury-waived cases to
pass on findings and conclusions. Uniformity is advisable
and, furthermore, a total absence of findings or any state-
ment of the grounds either in fact or law for the court's
decision in law cases, it is submitted, complicates the work
of both counsel and the appellate court.
A very important and vital change from the present
practice to be found in this Proposed Rule is that the find-
ings of the court in such cases shall have the same effect as
that now given to findings in suits 'in equity. What is the
effect of this provision? First, it involves the question
whether the enabling act confers power upon the Supreme
Court to prescribe rules of appellate procedure. It is sub-
mitted that it does.163 Secondly, it means that in law cases
Cf. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Rule 212. "If, in the opinion of the court, the
parties should be left to relief by existing forms of action, or for other reasons,
it may decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the grounds on
which its discretion is so exercised."
Proposed Rule 68.
'=Cf. N. Y. Crv. PRAc. Acr §§ 439 and 440, as amended in 1936; there is a
practice, in some districts, for the judge to direct that his opinion stand as the
findings of fact and conclusions of law required under this rule, cf. Lewys v.
O'Neill, 49 F. (2d) 603 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
1- Cf. Equity Rule 70/; 28 U. S. C. § 383.
" For a discussion of this question see Clark, Power of Supreme Court to
Make Rules of Appellate Procedure (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 1303.
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where a jury has been waived, the parties are entitled, at least
theoretically, to equity review, i.e., a re-examination of the
entire record and not to the limited review in law cases, i.e.,
a consideration of the legal errors which may have been com-
mitted by the trial court. Thirdly, it means that in law cases
where a jury trial has not been waived, the limited review
will continue since the Seventh Amendment to the Constitu-
tion provides that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise
re-examined in any court of the United States than according
to the rules of the common-law." Thus, there will persist
under this Proposed Rule a different scope of review in jury
cases on the one hand and non-jury and jury-waived cases on
the other hand. Furthermore, the parties in a law case who
have waived a jury trial will be entitled potentially to a more
extensive review on appeal than they would have been en-
titled to, if they had not waived a jury and also to a more
extensive review on appeal than they are entitled to at
present.104
As stated above, the equity review on appeal is deemed
to be a re-examination of the entire record. This right of a
hearing de novo in equity suits was due to a large extent to
the old practice under which testimony was taken by deposi-
tion and not orally in open court. These depositions, of course,
were in written form and could be examined without diffi-
culty as well by an appellate court as by the trial court, so
that the review really proceeded on written documents and
did not involve questions of credibility and the behavior on
the stand of the witness.16 5 When the Federal Equity Rules
were promulgated in 1912 providing that in all trials in
equity, with a limited exception, the testimony of witnesses
must be taken orally in open court and that the court had to
pass upon the admissibility of all evidence offered as in
actions at law, 66 the basis for the greater liberality in equity
I' Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact (1937) 4 U. OF CI. L.
REV. 190; Sunderland, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Cases
Where Juries Are Waived (1937) 4 U. oF CHi. L. REv. 218; Chesnut, Analysis
of Proposed New Federal Rules of'Procedure (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 533; 28
U. S. C. § 773 providing that the findings of the court in law cases tried without
a jury may be either general or special and shall have the same effect as the
verdict of the jury.
Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, loc. cit. supra note 164.
10 Equity Rule 46; the effective date of the Rules was February 1, 1913.
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appeals was no longer existent. It would seem, therefore,
that there was then no reason why the appellate court should
have greater powers of review in equity suits than in law
actions, except for the possible contention that a verdict after
a trial by a judge and a jury is entitled to more weight than
the holding of a judge alone. This contention seems un-
founded, and apparently that has been the thought of the
appellate courts in equity suits in stating that the findings
of the court of primary jurisdiction on the facts would be
upheld unless clearly erroneous since a trial judge who sees
and hears the witnesses is in a better position to determine
issues of fact than an appellate court which is limited to the
printed record. Furthermore, the appellate courts have held
that the trial courts' findings in equity suits are presump-
tively correct, and will be upheld on appeal except where
there is a clear showing of obvious error or mistake.16 7
It is suggested, therefore, that this rule be changed so
that the second sentence thereof provide that the findings of
the court in such cases shall have the same effect as that
heretofore given to the verdict, general or special, as the case
may be, of a jury in an action at law, or, "that the review by
the circuit court shall be limited to questions of law and that
findings of fact by the district court, if supported by substan-
tial evidence, shall be conclusive unless it shall clearly appear
that the findings of the district court are arbitrary or capri-
cious." 168 The tendency today is against indiscriminate ap-
peals, and properly so, and it is submitted that there remains
11 Cf. Clark and Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, loc. cit. supra note
164; Joyce v. Humbird, 78 F. (2d) 386 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935); in Johnson v.
Winsted, 64 F. (2d) 316 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) the court held: "In determining
what the facts are from the evidence which we regard as relevant and com-
petent, we have not lost sight of the established rule that the findings of the
trial court in suits in equity are presumptively correct, and unless clearly
against the weight of evidence or induced by an erroneous view of the law,
will not be disturbed. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of
New Jersey, 246 U. S. 32, 41, 38 S. Ct. 473, 62 L. Ed. 968; Butte & Superior
Copper Co., Ltd., v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 249 U. S. 12, 30, 39 S. Ct. 231.
63 L. Ed. 447; Unkle v. Wills (C. C. A. 8) 281 F. 29, 36, supra; Lion Oil
Refining Co. v. Albritton (C. C. A. 8) 21 F. (2d) 280, 282; Nave-McCord
Merc. Co. v. Ranney (C. C. A. 8) 29 F. (2d) 383, 389; Karn v. Andresen
(C. C. A. 8) 60 F. (2d) 427, 429."
16 47 U. S. C. § 96 now repealed by 47 U. S. C. § 402e (these provisions.
however, are repeated in the latter section); cf. Clark and Stone, Review of
Findings of Fact, loc. cit. supra note 164; Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New
Federal Rules of Procedure, loc. cit. supra note 164.
[VOL. 11
DRAFT OF FEDERAL RULES
no reason why appeals in equity or non-jury cases should
have to be reviewed more carefully or extensively than ap-
peals in law cases tried before a court and jury. A judge can
try a case at least as well as a judge and jury-perhaps
better. 16 9
The next Proposed Rule provides that no error or defect
or omission in any ruling, order or other action shall be
ground for a new trial or rehearing, or for setting aside a
verdict or reversing, annulling or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order unless it clearly appears that material
prejudice to the substantial rights of the objecting party has
resulted therefrom.170 This rule is a combination of certain
provisions of the Equity Rules and certain federal statutes
and presents the current tendency to prevent a miscarriage
of justice because of technical errors. 17'
We now come to the Proposed Rules intended to regulate
appellate procedure.172 Provision is first made that in cases
in which an appeal is permitted by law from a district court
to the Supreme Court of the United States, an appeal must
be sought, allowed and perfected within the time prescribed
by law and in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States governing such an appeal 7 3 No
change, therefore, has been made in the procedure to be
followed in direct appeals.174 It is to be noted that this rule
makes the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States
applicable to this class of cases as to the method of appealing
directly to the Supreme Court, but that it does not make
such rules applicable in preparing the record on appeal in
such cases. The preparation and contents of the record on
" But see Foreword to Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure on
p. xiv: "It is obvious that the method of obtaining conformity by limiting the
power of reviewing the findings in equity cases must be rejected"; Blume,
Review of Facts inr Non-Jury Cases (1936) 20 J. Am. Jim. Soc. 68.
170 Proposed Rule 70.17 Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 391, 777; Equity Rules 46 and 72.
17 Proposed Rules 71 to 77.
'Proposed Rule 71.
" Cf. Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 22 A.
B. A. J. 447, at 450: "A difficulty arises in that in some cases a direct appeal
lies from district courts to the Supreme Court, which also receives cases from
the state courts, though the more general appeal in federal cases is to the
Circuit Court of Appeals. Our Committee felt that it could not properly
recommend rules affecting direct appeals, and complete simplification of federal
appellate procedure must await action by that Court in connection with its own
rules of procedure."
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appeal in all cases is covered by a separate rule which will
be considered later.
With the exception of bankruptcy appeals under Section
24(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, an entirely new procedure is
provided for in appeals from the district court to the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Petition for appeal, allowance of appeal,
and citation are abolished. In their place the Proposed Rule
prescribes that a party may appeal from an order or judg-
ment by serving upon each appellee and filing with the dis-
trict court a notice of appeal. This notice must specify the
parties to the appeal and must be directed to each appellee;
it must designate the judgment or order, or part thereof,
appealed from; must contain appellant's assignments of
error; must specify the amount and surety of the bond on
appeal, or of the supersedeas bond, if any; and must specify
the court to which the appeal is taken and state that the
record will be docketed within forty days.17 5 The costs bond
must be in the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars unless
the court fixes a different amount or unless a supersedea8
bond is filed. If the bond is for two hundred and fifty dol-
lars, no court approval is necessary. 176 A supersedeas bond,
however, must be approved by the court, and the court is
given rather wide discretion in fixing the amount of the bond
and may even order security other than by way of bond.'77
This proposed method of taking an appeal is a decided im-
provement over the present cumbersome procedure, but why
require the incorporation of an assignment of errors in the
notice of appeal? The abolishment of assignments of errors
would do no harm.7 8
The antiquated method of summons and severance ' 79 is
1
" Proposed Rule 72(a) and (b).
1" Proposed Rule 72(c).
"Proposed Rule 72(d).
I' Cf. N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 562 which reads in part: "An appeal may be
taken by serving upon the attorney for the adverse party and upon the clerk
with whom the judgment or order appealed from is entered, by filing it in his
office, a written notice to the effect that the appellant appeals from the judgment
or order or from a specified part thereof. * * *"
"I Cf. Masterson v. Herndon, 10 Wall. 416 (U. S. 1870), where the court
said: "It is the established doctrine of this court that in cases at law, where
the judgment is joint, all the parties against whom it is rendered must join in
the writ of error; and in chancery cases, all the parties against whom a joint
decree is rendered must join in the appeal, or they will be dismissed. There
are two reasons for this: 1. That the successful party may be at liberty to
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abolished, but notice must be given to the other joint parties
that a separate appeal is being taken so that such other joint
parties may appeal in like manner.180
The process of making up the record on appeal has been
simplified, and provision is made for the abolishment of the
requirement of reducing the testimony to narrative form.181
The duty is imposed upon the party who first appeals to
serve and file within ten days after service of notice of his
appeal a written request designating the portions of the
record to be incorporated into the record on appeal. Any
other party within ten days thereafter may indicate addi-
tional portions of the record to be included. Thus, the an-
cient rule, if it ever existed in the federal courts, that a party
waives his bill of exceptions if he brings a writ of error
before he has procured the judge's signature to such bill 182
is definitely renounced. Whenever error is assigned relative
to testimony, the appellant must state in writing what parts
of the transcript of testimony he desires included in the rec-
ord and must furnish the clerk and the appellee with a com-
plete transcript of the testimony unless otherwise stipulated.
The appellee must then state what parts of the transcript of
the testimony he wishes included. The rule specifically pre-
scribes that the testimony to be included in the record shall
be set out in question and answer form, except when the
parties stipulate that it be reduced to narrative form. Thus
the pendulum has swung back again. The narrative form is
the exception and not the rule. The proposed change is a
salutary one. Some time after the enactment of the present
Equity Rules providing for the narrative form of record,18 3
the late Circuit Judge Mayer said as follows:
proceed in the enforcement of his judgment or decree against the parties who
do not desire to have it reviewed. 2. That the Appellate tribunal shall not be
required to decide a second or third time the same question on the same record
** * One of the effects of this judgment of severance was to bar the party
who refused to proceed, from prosecuting the same right in another action, as
the defendant could not be harassed by two separate actions on a joint obliga-
tion, or on account of the same cause of action, it being joint in its nature";
see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bunn, 285 U. S. 169, 52 Sup. Ct.
354 (1932).
"'Proposed Rule 73.
'Proposed Rule 74.
11 Cf. Hunnicutt v. Peyton, 102 U. S. 333 (1880).
"As to the present provisions, see Equity Rules 75 and 76; U. S. Sup. CT.
GEN. RULEs rule VIII; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Standard Asphalt &
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"Equity Rule 75. The provision as to 'narrative
form' is in my opinion undesirable. It puts an unnec-
essary and heavy burden upon counsel and where
counsel do not agree, the court also is burdened in
respect of a case the details of which may have escaped
it. Thus, the court may be compelled to read part of
the record in order to determine whether the narra-
tive is correct or to determine whether the testimony
shall be reproduced in the exact words of the witness.
In the first place, the narrative form rarely, if ever,
gives a true picture of the trial. Where a witness has
been evasive, the exact reproduction of his testimony
is the only method of displaying to the appellate court
what occurred below and sometimes even that is not
effective in a cold record. I a'm very strongly in favor
of that part of the rule which provides for 'all parts
not essential to the decision or the questions presented
by the appeal being omitted.' This responsibility, how-
ever, shall rest upon counsel and I think counsel are
not sufficiently alive to this responsibility." 184
There should be no doubt as to the correctness of these
observations. The narrative form requirement merely cre-
ated, both for the appellant and for the appellee, added bur-
dens and expense without compensating advantages.
The Proposed Rule further provides that when the clerk
has assembled the material for the record on appeal in accor-
dance with the requests of the parties, the record must be
submitted to the trial judge (or upon a finding of his inabil-
ity to act) to any other district judge for settlement upon
notice to the parties. The judge may revise the record so as
to set forth what he deems essential for the adequate presen-
tation of the errors to the appellate court. When the record
Rubber Co., 275 U. S. 372, 48 Sup. Ct. 183 (1928) ; Alexander v. Cosden, 290
U. S. 484, 54 Sup. Ct. 292 (1933).
I" Lane, Federal Equity Rules (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 276; see also
Griswold and Mitchell, The Narrative Record in Federal Equity Appeals
(1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 483; Lane, Twenty Years under the Federal Equity
Rules (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 638; Severn, Practical Results of Federal
Equity Rule 75(B) as to Restatement of Testhnony in Narrative Form (1936)
34 Mic. L. REv. 1093; Chesnut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 533.
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is finally approved, the court must certify it and it will then
be the record on appeal and must be printed as provided by
law. If anything material to either party is omitted by acci-
dent or error in the transcript, the appellate court on a
proper suggestion or on its own motion, may direct that the
omission be corrected by a supplemental transcript. The
Committee has also proposed an alternative rule which pro-
vides that a printed record is not required and three type-
written transcripts, certified by the court of the proceedings
below, are all that is transmitted to the appellate court. It
is provided that the parties may stipulate to omit portions
of the proposed record. Provision is further made for the
appellate court by standing rule to require that the printed
briefs of the parties shall reproduce those portions of the
record which may be necessary to the understanding of the
parties' respective assignment of errors. It is doubtful
whether the alternative rule would work well in practice. A
few typewritten copies in the appellate court and parts
of the record in the briefs of the parties seem a rather
unsatisfactory way of handling an appeal. The record should
be printed and contain so much of the evidence and other
proceedings upon the trial as are material to the questions to
be raised upon the appeal and no more. 85
'The Committee in its Note to this rule suggests another
method providing simply for the transmission to the reviewed
court of the original papers and report of proceedings had at
the trial. However, under this method the parties must also
print in their briefs such parts of the record as they desire
to call to the court's attention.' 8 Such procedure is too
informal and too loose to be adopted generally.
Provision is also made for an abbreviated record on
appeal where the questions presented by an appeal can be
determined by the appellate court without an examination
of all the pleadings and evidence. In such a case the parties,
with the approval of the district court, may prepare and sign
a statement of the case showing how the questions arose and
were decided by the trial court and setting forth so much only
of the facts alleged and proved, or sought to be proved, as is
Cf. N. Y. Civ. PiAc. RULE 232.
1 Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure (May, 1936) at p. 137.
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essential to a decision of such question by the reviewing
court.'8 7 This is Equity Rule 77 with minor changes. Why a
separate rule on this point? Why not combine these provi-
sions with Proposed Rule 72?
The next two rules deal generally with stay of execution
as of right and in the discretion of the court and with injunc-
tion pending appeal. 188 Both refer to certain statutes and
also "to any like statute"; as to form, they properly fall with-
in the condemnation of Dean Wigmore. 89
PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND OTHER SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS (ARTICL VIII)
The first rule under this title deals with provisional and
final remedies and other special remedies, including arrest,
attachment, garnishment, replevin, sequestration, "and other
corresponding or equivalent remedies, however designated"
and provides that such remedies shall be available under the
then existing law of the state in which the district court is
held, subject to the following qualifications: (1) Any existing
statute of the United States shall govern to the extent to
which it is applicable; (2) the process for such remedies
must be issued by the clerk of the court and be served by
the marshal unless some other person is specially designated
by the court; (3) the action in which any of these remedies
are used shall be commenced and prosecuted, or, if removed
from a state court, shall be prosecuted after such removal
pursuant to the proposed rules.' 90 This rule, so states the
Committee, adopts the existing federal law, making it clear,
however, that the applicable state law is that law existing at
the time of bringing suit. A similar practice is laid down for
execution and proceedings in aid of the execution or judg-
ment.' 9 ' Thus, in these important matters, the Committee
has turned away completely from the express purpose of the
Proposed Rules-to provide for a unified procedure for ac-
"8 Proposed Rule 75.
'Proposed Rules 76 and 77.
"
8 Cf. note 16 and supra pp. 217-218.
'" Proposed Rule 78.
" Proposed Rule 83.
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tions in the federal courts. The result is a new conformity
act for these particular remedies. This is most unfortunate.
Adequate provision should be made for uniformity in these
vital branches of practice. A federal statute provides that in
common-law causes in the district courts the plaintiff is
entitled to similar remedies, by attachment or other proc-
ess, against the property of the defendant, which were at the
effective date of the statute provided by the laws of the state
in which such district court is held.192 But the United States
Supreme Court has held that in o 'der to issue an attachment,
the defendant must be subject to personal service or volun-
tarily appear in the action aud accordingly an attachment is
still but an incident to a suit, and unless jurisdiction can be
obtained over the defendant, his estate cannot be attached in
the federal court.193 Would this decision still be the law
under the Proposed Rule? The answer should be in the
affirmative since no provision has been made by statute or
by the Proposed Rules for service by publication except in a
limited class of cases 194 and there naturally has been no at-
tempt to enlarge the jurisdiction of the -district courts.
It is, however, held that if property is attached on a writ
issued out of a state court and the statutes of the state
authorized the attachment, upon removal of the cause to
the federal court, jurisdiction" over the property will be
retained, notwithstanding the attachment would not confer
jurisdiction had it been made on a writ issued out of the
federal court and no personal service had been obtained.195
Would this holding be followed under the Proposed Rule?
There are at present also federal statutes mak-
ing the state laws relating to arrest and executions, etc.,
applicable to the federal courts in common-law causes; the
statutes, however, usually limit the conformity to the law
existing in the states at the effective date of the respective
statutes.196 Furthermore, the Committee, in its note to Rule
83, dealing with execution, cites numerous federal statutes
1228 U. S. C. §726.
" Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U. S. 31, 33 Sup. Ct. 694 (1912); St.
Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. 47 (1924).
2-28 U. S. C. § 118.
" Clark v. Wills, 203 U. S. 164, 27 Sup. Ct. 43 (1906); McNeil-Edwards
Co. v. Frank L. Young Co., 42 F. (2d) 362 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
28 U. S. C. §§ 724, 727, 729 and 843-84.
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bearing on the subject of execution which it is the intention
of the rule to continue in force. It is submitted that further
consideration be given to this Proposed Rule with the thought
in mind that the uniformity in federal procedure should cer-
tainly not fail in these important particulars.
'No substantial innovation in the present procedure has
been introduced by the Proposed Rule dealing with tempo-
rary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. 197 The
rule, however, continues certain statutes dealing with injunc-
tions and expressly states that there is no intention to mod-
ify the Act relating to temporary restraining orders and pre-
liminary injunctions in cases affecting employer and em-
ployee.198
With respect to receivers the Proposed Rules are very
brief, stating merely that the practice relating to the appoint-
ment of receivers and the administration of estates by receiv-
ers shall be in accordance with the principles of equity as
now administered in the federal courts. All statutes appli-
cable to receivers are, therefore, continued in effect. 9 9 Com-
ment on this method of procedure is unn'ecessary.
Proposed Rules 81 and 82 deal with the matter of
deposit in court and offer of judgment and require no com-
ment.
Provision is also made for the enforcement of judgments
for specific acts permitting such acts to be done by a person
appointed by the court where the party who was directed to
do so has failed to comply with the court order. The rule
provides that the act, when so done, shall have like effect as
if done by such party, and also provides that the judgment
may itself vest title without the intervention of a third per-
son.20 0 Punishment as for a contempt is also prescribed.
A highly desirable rule is the one which provides for the
registration of judgments with other district courts of the
United States.20 1 A judgment so registered shall, for the pur-
pose of enforcement, have the same effect, and like proceed-
"Proposed Rule 79; cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 381-383 and Equity Rule 73.
" Last paragraph of Proposed Rule 79 and Committee's note to this rule.
Proposed Rule 80.
-Proposed Rule 84; cf. Equity Rules 7-9; ENGLAND, SUPREME COURT
OF JUDICATURE ACT (1925) § 47.
" Proposed Rule 85.
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ings may be taken thereon, as if the judgment had been
originally rendered by the court in which such registration
is had. The rule is presented in alternative form, one in
rather detail form, the other similar to the statement given.
The latter seems decidedly preferable. There is some ques-
tion whether this matter comes within the province of pro-
cedure and whether it does not affect substantive rights.20 2
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will decide that it is
within the province of procedure.
DISTRICT COURTS AND CLERKS (ARTICLE IX)
Under this title it is prescribed, in the usual manner, that
the courts are always deemed open for the purpose of filing
papers and issuing process. All trials or hearings on the
merits must be conducted in open court, but all other acts
or proceedings may be conducted or done by the court in
chambers, provided that no hearing may be conducted out-
side the district without the consent of all parties affected.2 0 3
Provision is also made to the effect that the entry of an order
or judgment shall not of itself be deemed notice to the parties
or their attorneys. Notice of entry must be mailed by the
clerk to the parties involved, such mailing to be sufficient
notice for all purposes for which notice of the entry of an
order or judgment must be given. It would seem, however,
that the time to appeal is not enlarged by this provision.204
APPLICABIITY OF THE RULES (ARTICLE X)
Under this title it is provided that the rules shall apply in
all civil actions in the district courts and in the District Court
of the United States for the District of Columbia, but shall not
apply to proceedings in admiralty or proceedings in probate in
'Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure (May, 1936) p. xvii.
and pp. 156-187.
Proposed Rule 87.
" Cf. 28 U. S. C. §§ 230 and 350 providing that no appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals and no appeal or writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
shall be allowed or entertained unless application therefor be made within three
months after the entry of the judgment or decree sought to be reviewed.
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the District of Columbia, nor shall they apply to proceedings
in bankruptcy or copyright, except in so far as they may be
made applicable by rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
of the United States. In the latter two cases the Committee
calls attention to the desirability of changes in the bank-
ruptcy and copyright rules so as to make the practice con-
form to these rules in other civil cases. °5 This rule also
shortens the time within which a defendant removing a cause
to a federal court must plead after removal from thirty days
to five days, unless the state practice fixes a longer period, in
which event the law, of the state will apply. In a removed
case if a jury trial has not been already waived prior to
removal (presumably under the state law), any party may
demand a jury trial if demand is served and filed within ten
days after the record is filed in the district court.
The Proposed Rules specifically provide that the juris-
diction of the district courts is not extended and "each rule
shall be taken as limited to actions and issues which are
within such jurisdiction." 206
The district courts are given the right to make supple-
mentary rules.2 0 7 The question may be asked whether this is
advisable when uniformity is the objective sought. It might
be well to limit this right solely to mechanical matters such
as calendar practice and the like or at least prescribe that
the approval of the circuit court embracing the district is
essential before the amendment shall become effective.
This ends the consideration of the rules as presently
proposed. There is, however, an important matter which does
not seem to be covered by the Proposed Rules. No provision
is made as to what shall be the source of the principles which
shall govern matters not covered by the rules. Is it the Con-
formity Act in law cases, and is it the Equity Rules in
equity cases? If the answer to the foregoing question is in
the affirmative it would be unfortunate. Conformity to state
Proposed Rule 90; consider Committee's note to Proposed Rule 90, p. 166
of Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure (May, 1936).
Proposed Rule 91.
' Proposed Rule 92.
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practice in so-called law cases on matters omitted by the
rules would open the way to serious perversion of the spirit
of the rules in reactionary districts. This danger has already
been emphasized in respect of the proposed provisional reme-
dies and execution rules where conformity to state laws
has again been made the talisman. There is no specific objec-
tion to conforming matters in so-called equity omitted, by
the rules, to the present Federal Equity Rules. They have
worked well in general and are, of course, uniform through-
out the districts, but that, does not solve the problem.
Complete uniformity is without doubt a utopia but
nothing should be done or left undone which will lend
encouragement to anyone or any district court to ignore the
Rules of Civil Procedure in order to favor the state practice.
All that is needed is a general clause on this subject. It is
submitted that the rules should contain a provision setting
forth a general method of legal thought stating that the
practice in all cases not expressly prescribed by the rules
shall be the practice now existing in the federal courts in
equity, and that if the particular matters not covered by the
rules are not susceptible of regulation by the practice in
equity, the practice and procedure with respect thereto shall
be conducted according to the common law, in contra-distinc-
tion to the common law of any particular state.208 It is con-
ceded that the common law as thus limited is somewhat hard
to define, also sometimes hard to discover,209 but at least
there is the advantage of prescribing that uniformity must
be adhered to among the various districts.2 1 0
' In considering the meaning of the "common law" contained in the
Seventh Amendment the United States Supreme Court held that it meant the
rules of the common law of England, and not the rules of that law as modified
by local statute or usage in any of the states (Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580 (1898).
' Viz. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U. S. 364, 33 Sup. Ct. 523
(1913), and Baltimore and Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U. S. 654, 55 Sup. Ct.
890 21935).
, Proceedings of Assembly (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 685, at 726, where
Mr. Edward J. Dimock of New York suggested that a rule be added on this
subject reading somewhat as follows: "With respect to the matters not covered
by these rules the practice and procedure shall be conducted according to the
present practice of the United States district courts in equity in so far as such
matters are susceptible of regulation by the practice in equity. In so far as
such matters are not susceptible of regulation by the practice in equity, the
practice and procedure with respect thereto shall be conducted according to the
common law."
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In conclusion another point should be mentioned. The
original section of the rule-making statute which provides
merely for uniform rules in actions at law contains a specific
provision that such rules "shall take effect six months after
their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict there-
with shall be of no further force or effect." No such provision
is found in the second section providing for uniform rules in
law and in equity, under which the Committee has been
acting. It is only prescribed that "such rules shall not take
effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the
Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session
thereof and until after the close of such session." The situa-
tion is accordingly presented that a single rule applying both
in cases formerly cognizable in equity and in cases formerly
cognizable at law, might be declared invalid as to equity
suits at least, if contrary to an existing statute. It is sug-
gested that the act be amended to include a provision similar
to that now found in section one or that this matter be
presented to Congress for action at the same time that the
rules are reported to Congress by the Attorney General.
WnRNER ILSEN.
St. John's University School of Law.
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